Other transactions for prototypes as used in the commercial operations and support savings initiative 1997: a contractors' perspective by Slade, William Collier
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1998-06
Other transactions for prototypes as used in the
commercial operations and support savings initiative
1997: a contractors' perspective
Slade, William Collier









OTHER TRANSACTIONS FOR PROTOTYPES
AS USED IN THE
COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT SAVINGS








Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
June 1998
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE OTHER TRANSACTIONS FOR PROTOTYPES AS USED IN THE















The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI) is a Government effort to reduce Operations and
Support (O&S) costs by inserting commercial products and processes into fielded military systems. This initiative
utilizes Other Transactions for Prototypes, also known as Section 845 Agreements, to attract non-traditional
Government contractors and to speed the development of prototype kits for insertion. This thesis examines the
benefits and limitations, from the contractors' perspective, of using Section 845 Agreements, as applied in COSSI 97.
The Researcher concludes that the participants found the Agreements to be effective tools that fostered improved
relations with the Government. The Agreement also resulted in an expanded vendor base; six of the 30 participants
are non-traditional contractors and would not have participated, had an Agreement not been used. The Researcher
concludes that the participants identified the Government's inexperience with the Agreement as a major limitation.
The research also shows that the full potential of the Authority can only be achieved by innovative, trained
Agreements Officers who are knowledgeable of the program's objectives. The Researcher makes several
recommendations for an agency using or preparing to use the Authority; one of which is to provide follow-on training
for non-traditional contractors.
14. SUBJECT TERMS

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
11
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
OTHER TRANSACTIONS FOR PROTOTYPES AS USED IN THE
COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT SAVINGS
INITIATIVE 1997: A CONTRACTORS' PERSPECTIVE
William Collier Slade
Captain, United Stages Army
B.A., Wofford College, 1987
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of








The Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI) is a
Government effort to reduce Operations and Support (O&S) costs by inserting
commercial products and processes into fielded military systems. This initiative utilizes
Other Transactions for Prototypes, also known as Section 845 Agreements, to attract non-
traditional Government contractors and to speed the development of prototype kits for
insertion. This thesis examines the benefits and limitations, from the contractors'
perspective, of using Section 845 Agreements, as applied in COSSI 97.
The Researcher concludes that the participants found the Agreements to be
effective tools that fostered improved relations with the Government. The Agreement
also resulted in an expanded vendor base; six of the 30 participants are non-traditional
contractors and would not have participated, had an Agreement not been used.
The Researcher concludes that the participants identified the Government's
inexperience with the Agreement as a major limitation. The research also shows that the
full potential of the Authority can only be achieved by innovative, trained Agreements
Officers who are knowledgeable of the program's objectives.
The Researcher makes several recommendations for an agency using or preparing
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
In 1993, William J. Perry, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, addressed the severity of
the growing gap between the commercial sector and defense industrial base when he
stated, "The new technologies that are most critical to our technological advantage
—
computers, software, semiconductors, telecommunication—are all being driven by
commercial, not defense markets." [Ref. 36:p. 3] He called for the military to "...Get on
the shoulders of these commercial industries so that we can take full advantage of them."
[Ref. 36:p. 3] But even today, getting on their "shoulders" is easier said then done. An
ocean of divergent bureaucratic and administrative systems still separate Government
practices from commercial industry practices and often prevent the military from
acquiring leading edge technology. Overcoming these barriers is not possible with a
"business as usual" mentality; it requires new, innovative ways of doing business.
One such innovative effort is the use of Other Transactions (OT). Legislation in
1989, which was codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2371, gave the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) the authority to "enter into transactions other than contracts,
cooperative agreements, and grants." [Ref. 43:2371] DARPA has interpreted the statute
to mean that OTs are a class of transactions outside the procurement and assistance laws
and regulations including the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) or other laws and regulations specific to
the procurement system. [Ref. 16:p. 35]
This type of agreement is therefore much more flexible than a standard contract.
For example, in general, OTs allow for the negotiation of intellectual property rights, the
acceptance of commercial accounting systems, and do not require Government cost
audits. The initial OT Authority was granted only to DARPA and was limited to
conducting research. This type of OT is referred to as OTs for Research or §2371
Agreement. Over the last several years, Congress has granted the Services §2371
Authority and permitted the application of OTs to a broader area of acquisition, including
technology demonstrations and prototypes. In contrast to the original authority, this is
referred to as an OT for Prototype or by the amendment from which it was created, a
Section 845 Agreement.
One pilot initiative, organized by DARPA and sponsored by the Dual Use
Applications Program (DUAP), which broadly applies the use of Section 845 Authority,
is the Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI). COSSI's purpose
is to develop and test a method for reducing Department of Defense Operations and
Support (O&S) costs by inserting commercial products and processes into fielded
military systems. The insertion of commercial products and processes is expected to
reduce O&S costs by reducing the costs of parts and maintenance, reducing the need for
specialized equipment, increasing reliability and increasing the efficiency of subsystems.
[Ref. 29:p. 2.1]
This initiative is divided into two stages. During Stage I, each selected contractor
will conduct non-recurring engineering (NRE) required to create a kit that can be used in
a fielded military system. Stage II is the actual purchase of a reasonable production
quantity of kits and then the insertion of kits. The general intent of using an OT is to
attract those businesses that would generally not do business with the Government for
fear of its regulatory grasp, reduce costs by cutting down on required oversight and to
speed up development of the item.
Congress appropriated $100 million in fiscal year 97 (FY97) for COSSI (COSSI
97) but did not appropriate funds for COSSI 98. Plans for COSSI 99 are underway and
according to a Congressional source cited in the Defense News, "Prospects for full
funding are bright for 1999." [Ref. 34:p. 6]
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The primary objective of this research is to identify what the contractors perceive
as the benefits and limitations of an agreement crafted with Section 845 Authority as
applied in COSSI 97. Additional objectives include categorizing the firms that
participated as either traditional or non-traditional Government contractors; identifying
how important the perceived benefits of an OT were in attracting firms to respond to the
COSSI solicitation; and determining if the contractors would participate in another
Section 845 Agreement.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
From the contractors' perspective, what are the benefits and limitations of using
Other Transactions (Section 845 Agreements) as applied in the Commercial Operations
and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI) 1997?
2. Subsidiary:
a. What are Section 845 Agreements?
b. What is the Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI)
1997?
c. Was the use of a Section 845 Agreement a primary factor in attracting firms to
respond to the COSSI solicitation?
d. Were the firms selected for COSSI 97 Traditional or Non-traditional
Government contractors?
e. What benefits have the contractors found when participating in an agreement
crafted with Section 845 Authority?
f. What limitations have the contractors found when participating in an
agreement crafted with Section 845 Authority?
g. Based on their COSSI experience, would the contractors enter into another
Section 845 Agreement?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS
1. Scope
The scope of this thesis is limited to the views of the 30 contractors participating
in COSSI 97.
2. Limitations
Due to the extreme variances in the size of the companies, the position and level
of involvement of the commercial Points of Contact (POC), the researcher was unable to
ensure that all topics were addressed by each interviewee in the same level of detail.
Because of these variances in the research population, the results of the interviews have
not been tabulated for statistical purposes.
E. METHODOLOGY
The primary research objective of this thesis is to present the contractor's
perspective of the benefits and limitations of an agreement crafted with Section 845
Authority. To meet this objective the researcher first conducted a literature review of
sources including but not limited to, the following:
• Unclassified Department of Defense (DoD) publications;
• References, publications and electronic media available at the Naval Postgraduate
School;
• Published academic research papers;
• Internet websites and homepages (DoD, commercial and academic)
The researcher then contacted the Government Agreements Officers for the 30
COSSI agreements and obtained appropriate Points of Contact (POC) for each
commercial firm. The researcher conducted telephone interviews with at least one
representative from each firm. All respondents were given the assurance of anonymity.
F. BENEFITS OF THE THESIS
This thesis will promote a greater understanding of the contractors' perception of
the Section 845 Agreement. This improved understanding will lead to a more effective
implementation of Section 845 Authority because it will assist policy makers and
agreements officers in determining if the intended goals are in fact being communicated
to and then internalized by the contractor.
By identifying those areas that the contractor finds most beneficial, this thesis will
also highlight logical starting points for implementing change within the current,
regulated acquisition system.
And finally, one last benefit is that this thesis will promote additional studies by
identifying areas for further research.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter I. Introduction Identifies the focus and purpose of the thesis and states the
primary and subsidiary research questions.
Chapter II. Background Provides the reader with an overview and necessary
background information on Section 845 Authority and COSSI.
Chapter III. Interview Methodology and Responses Presents a description of the
interview methodology and a categorization of the results.
Chapter IV. Analysis Provides analysis of the major benefits and limitations of an
agreement crafted with Section 845 Authority.
Chapter V. Recommendation and Conclusions Provides the researcher's principal
conclusions and recommendations from this study.

II. BACKGROUND
This chapter orients the reader for the remainder of the thesis. It first presents a
brief description of the pertinent issues that underlie the drive for the Government to
develop innovative ways of doing business, then presents background on the evolution of
Section 845 Authority and ends with an overview of the Commercial Operations &
Support Savings Initiative (COSSI).
A. ENVIRONMENT
There are many factors that have contributed to the Government's effort to
improve how it does business. Two of these issues that pertain directly to OTs and to
COSSI are discussed below.
1. Untapped Technology
Advanced technology is no longer the monopoly of the military and, increasingly,
those that have the technology often refuse to do business with the Government.
According to management consultant Robert Spreng, "A significant share of the most
valuable research and product development activity in commercial companies is virtually
unavailable to Federal Government, despite potential benefits to both parties." [Ref.
40:p. 3] He made this statement as part of a study which compared Department of
Defense (DoD) Research, Development, Test and Engineering (RDT&E) contract
awards, with Business Week Research & Development (R&D) scorecard and the Fortune
500 Industrials. Spreng found that "95% of the industry/group leaders that invested the
greatest percentage of their sales in R&D received insignificant or no DoD RDT&E
awards." [Ref. 40:p. 3] "These firms were usually on the leading edge of technology
developments in their industry." [Ref. 40 :p. 3] Spreng concluded that:
Commercial firms will offer the Government significantly more of the
needed state-of-the-art technologies, some right off of the laboratory shelf,
when the Government can make available adequate protection for
commercial intellectual property and incorporate the use of existing
commercial accounting methods for R&D." [Ref. 40 :p. 3]
2. Operations and Support (O&S) Costs
It is certainly no surprise that as the defense budget shrinks, acquiring new
weapon systems becomes increasingly difficult, if not impossible. This reliance on
fielded weapon systems has brought to light the staggering expense of maintaining these
systems. It is often reported that 70% of the life cycle costs of a weapon system are
incurred after those systems are fielded. In a DoD news briefing, Paul Kaminski, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology, declared, "...this is a problem
we have to attack in a fundamental way." [Ref. 32:p. 2] He views reducing O&S costs
as a zero sum game. "Money that we don't have to spend for operating and support of
those systems is money that, in turn, we can be spending on modernization." [Ref.32:p. 2]
B. OTHER TRANSACTIONS (OT)
1. §2371 Authority
Legislation in 1989, which was codified at 10 U.S.C. 2371, gave DARPA
the authority to "enter into transactions other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and
grants." [Ref. 43] DARPA has interpreted the statute to mean that OTs are a class of
transactions outside the procurement and assistance laws and regulations including the
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Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) or other laws and regulations specific to the procurement
system.fRef. 16: p. 35] "Laws of general applicability such as title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, the trade Secrets Act, and Conflict of Interest statute are applicable." [Ref. 16:p. 35]
This original authority was experimental in nature, valid only for a two year period.
Statutory language restricted the use of OTs for those times when a standard contract or
grant was not feasible or appropriate. Cost sharing, although not absolutely required, was
to be used if "practicable." [Ref. 18:p. 2] The use was further restricted in that it could
not be used for the principal purpose of acquiring goods and services for the direct benefit
or use of the Federal Government. [Ref. 41 :p. 5] This type of OT is therefore referred to
as OTs for Research or §2371 Agreements. In 1991 Congress showed its support of the
use of §2371 Agreements by making the authority permanent and by extending the
authority to all Services.
2. Section 845 Authority
In 1993 Congress amended 10 U.S.C.§2371 to allow DARPA expanded
use of OTs under Section 845. This authority was limited for a period of three years. As
finally enacted, the text of the statue read as follows:
The Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency may, under the
authority of section 2371 of title 10, United States Code, carry out
prototype projects that are directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems
proposed to be acquired or developed by the Department of Defense. [Ref.
18:p.3]
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DARPA has interpreted "prototype projects that are directly relevant" to
include subsystems, components and technologies as well as training, simulation,
auxiliary and support equipment "directly relevant" to "weapons or weapons systems."
[Ref. 16:p. 36] DARPA also interpreted the words "proposed to be acquired" in the
broadest sense. "Certainly it does not mean that a formal requirement has already been
established." [Ref. 16:p. 36] DARPA understands it to mean that, "If it [a prototype of
some sort] works, it may be the kind of thing that we would buy." [Ref. 16:p. 36] This
broad interpretation offers great latitude.
Section 845 Agreements also differed from §2371 Agreements in that do
they not require cost sharing "to the extent practicable" and they do require competition
to be used to the "maximum extent practicable." [Ref. 18:p. 8] The statute does not
specify the type or characteristics of the competition.
Section 845 Authority does not extend into production. DARPA is seeking
the legislative authority, which would allow an approved Section 845 prototype to
transition directly into production, but has not yet obtained it. [Ref 17:p. 18] In a 1996
Memorandum, Rick Dunn, General Counsel for DARPA advises that:
If a Section 845 systems project involves innovative business and
contracting practices, advanced planning must be done to obtain
appropriate waivers and exemptions for business practices that will be
carried over to the production program. This might include having the
project designated a pilot acquisition program in order to obtain expanded
waiver authority. [Ref. 18:p. 18]
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Section 804 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
extended the authority of Section 845 through September 30, 1999, and made it available
to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and to any other official designated by the
Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 32:p. 1] For the purpose of this thesis, Section 845/804
Authority will be referred to as Section 845 Authority.
In December 1996, Kaminski issued a memorandum designating the
Directors of the Defense Agencies as having the authority to use Section 845 Authority.
In addition to describing the authority, he lauded its flexibility but warned that it should
not be wielded unwisely:
If you delegate authority to use Section 845, 1 expect it will be to officials
whose level of responsibility, business acumen, and judgement enable
them to operate in this relatively unstructured environment. If we use this
authority wisely, I will request that it be extended or made permanent by
the Congress. [Ref. 32:p. 2]
C. COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT SAVINGS INITIATIVE
1. A New Approach
In recognition of the untapped technology and rising O&S costs, the Dual-Use
Applications Program (DUAP) developed Commercial Operations & Support Savings
Initiative (COSSI), a pilot program designed to lower the cost of the acquisition of
weapon system upgrades by introducing commercially developed processes or products
into fielded weapon systems.
In January 1997 DUAP issued a broad agency announcement (BAA) via the
World Wide Web seeking COSSI proposals for the engineering, testing and delivery of
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"prototype kits" to the military services..." [Ref. 26] Each kit was to consist of a
commercial product or process that had been adapted, qualified tested and readied for
insertion. [Ref. 26] The commercial products and processes are expected to lower O&S
costs by reducing the cost of parts and maintenance, by reducing the need for specialized
equipment, increasing reliability, and by increasing the efficiency of subsystems. [Ref.
29:p.2.1]
The solicitation for COSSI 1997 also stated that proposals were to be submitted
by firms or teams that included at least one for-profit firm. Proposals must also have the
written support of a "military customer." [Ref. 29:p. 2.1]
2. Structure
COSSI consists of two stages as depicted in Figure 2-1 and described below.
Stage I - 1STRE
(DUAP Funds) (Service Funds)
Stage II -- Procurernen
Stage I: Non-Recurring Engineering and Testing (DUAP Funds)
Flexible co st sharing with industry, 845/804 agreements
Deli' ei p rototyp es, demo nstrate savings potential
Stage II: Procurement and Retrofit (Service Funds)
Price b ased contract for 'l&its" (no industry cost share)
Option for contractor life cycle support
Figure 2-1 Ref. 24 :p. 5-2
a. Stage I
Stage I involves the application of Non-Recurring Engineering to create a
kit that can be used in a fielded military system. It also involves the testing of the kit to
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ensure that it will produce the predicted O&S cost savings while maintaining the current
system level performance. [Ref. 29:p. 2.5] Funding for is provided through DUAP.
b. Stage II
If during Stage I, the contractor has successfully demonstrated the
applicability of the prototype kit, then Stage II consists of the purchase by the military
customer of a reasonable production quantity of the kit. Purchase of the kits is to occur
without re-competition, at a fair and reasonable price based on an analysis of the value of
the kits to the Service and without requiring participants to provide detailed cost and
pricing data. [Ref. 29:p. 2.5.2] Funding for Stage II is to come from the Services. Figure
2-2 is a conceptual model depicting the integration of Stage I and Stage II into a fielded
weapon system. [Text blocks have been blackened for improved readability.]
STAGE I






Commercial Product or Process "Core"
(Available in commercial marketplace to non-
government customers)
NRE (if needed) adds adaptation
and wrapping
Qual testing enables military





STAGE II (Insertion) \\
Fielded Military System
Figure 2-2 Ref. 28 :p. 2.5.1
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3. Use of Section 845 Agreement
DUAP mandated that Stage I be carried out with an Other Transaction for
Prototypes (Section 845 Agreement). The solicitation for COSSI 97 stated:
This type of agreement allows a great deal more flexibility and has far
fewer regulatory requirements than a typical federal acquisition (FAR)
contract. In particular, this initiative will not generally require
Government cost accounting standards or Government cost audits.
Furthermore, intellectual property provisions may be negotiated that differ
from those usually found in procurement contracts. [Ref. 29:p. 2.8]
Realizing that few individuals had experience with this Authority, DUAP
conducted Section 845 training for the Government Agreement Officers and provided a
sample agreement to serve as a model upon which to build. (See Appendix B, Sample
845/804 Agreement)
4. Cost Sharing
Although cost sharing is not required under statute, the COSSI solicitation
stipulated that contractors were expected to share the costs of Stage I. There was no
minimum or maximum level specified, but proposals that include higher levels of non-
Federal funding will be viewed "more favorably." [Ref. 29:p. 2.7]
The rationale for cost sharing as described in the solicitation is that it
demonstrates confidence by the members of a proposal team that they will successfully
reach Stage II. [Ref. 29:p. 2.7] Government reimbursed Independent Research and




DARPA stipulated that funding for Stage I would be based on payable milestones.
Payable milestones are significant, observable, technical events that the contractor and
the Government agree in advance will be the basis for incremental payments. [Ref. 29 :p.
2.8]
6. Intellectual Property Rights
The allocation of rights and grants of licenses in intellectual property developed in
Stage I will be negotiable. [Ref. 29:p. 5.0] However, the Government's going-in position
with respect to patentable inventions, was that the same rights and licenses apply as if
Bayh-Dole 1 were applicable. [Ref. 29:p. 5.0]
The requirement for Stage I technical data (as defined in the FAR) is that a COSSI
contractor provide a Tech Data Package containing the form, fit function and interface
(F3I) specifications of the kit. As stated in the solicitation:
"We are not interested in obtaining any special Government rights in
proprietary technology for the inserted kit or in the underlying commercial
product or process." [Ref. 29:p. 5.1]
1 The provisions of Bayh-Dole, Public Law 96-517, as amended, provide the Government's general policy
regarding patents rights in inventions developed with federal assistance. In general, the Government's
policy is to allow the contractor to elect to retain title to the subject inventions while providing the
Government a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable paid up license to practice or have practiced for
on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world. [Ref. 22:p.7]
17
D. SCHEDULE, SELECTION CRITERIA AND RESULTS FOR COSSI 97
1. Schedule and Activity
The following is a listing of the COSSI 97 activities and scheduled dates
for completion. [Ref. 29:p. 2.8]
Date Activity
January 15, 1997 Solicitation Published
February 12, 1997 Bidder's Conference
March 18, 1997 Proposals Due
May 2, 1997 Proposals Selected
September 30, 1997 Agreements in Place
2. Selection Criteria
The following is an abbreviated listing of the six selection criteria. [Ref. 29 :p. 3.1]
These criteria are not rank ordered.
• O&S Savings The extent to which the proposed kit will reduce the O&S
costs of the fielded system and the likelihood that these proposed savings will
be achieved.
• Commercial Technology Leverage Degree to which commercial processes
make up the core of the kit and the degree to which the kit will use open
commercial standards.
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• Equivalent System Performance Assurance and plans to demonstrate that
the use of the kit will maintain at least equivalent levels system performance
after insertion.
• Technical and Management Approach Degree to which the project
management plan supports the Government's confidence of success in the
project and the adequacy of the resources for the proposed project.
• Military Customer Commitment Confidence presented by the military
customer that this project will achieve significant O&S savings and
demonstration that the military customer either has or is actively pursuing
funds for acquiring the proposed kits for Stage II.
• Non-Federal Cost Share Level of proposed costs offered to bear and the
quality of the share of Stage I cost.
3. Results
Eighty-one proposals were submitted for evaluation by the Services and 30 were
selected. (See Appendix A, COSSI Participants and Projects) The Government cost share
for Stage I is $97 million with the participants contributing $91 million. If all Stage I
projects proceed to Stage II, the procurement costs for the Government will be $1,018
billion. The initial estimate of the net present values of the savings to be generated by
these projects is expected to exceed $3.0 billion. [Ref. 24:p. 5-3]
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has presented an overview of Section 845 Authority and of COSSI.
This overview was in effect from the Government's perspective, presenting how the
DUAP initiative, utilizing Section 845 Authority, is intended to work. The next chapter
presents the researcher's methodology and, most importantly, the contractors' perspective
on how the Section 845 Authority actually worked.
20
III. INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY AND RESPONSES
This chapter describes the methodology used by the researcher, the broad





Contractor Points Of Contact (POC)
The researcher contacted the Government Agreements Officers for the 30 COS SI
agreements and obtained appropriate POCs for each commercial firm. The researcher
then conducted phone interviews with representatives knowledgeable about the COSSI
agreements, and followed up with email to request additional information, or to request
clarification of specific issues.
2. Conduct of the Interview
To encourage greater feedback, the researcher asked the primary research question
outright and also directed the interview to general topics relevant to the Agreement.
In the course of the interview, many non-solicited opinions and perspectives were
offered. The researcher believes that many of these comments, although outside of the
scope of the primary research question, are useful and has included them in the
"Response" portion of this chapter. For all interviews, the emphasis of the discussion
was on the administrative aspects of the agreement, and not on the technical aspects.




The intent of this discussion was to determine the number of traditional vs.
non-traditional companies participating in COSSI 97. For purposes of this thesis,
traditional companies are defined as those companies whose business practices are
predominately oriented toward conducting business with the Government. Non-
traditional companies are those companies whose business practices are not
predominately oriented towards the Government. When the business practice orientation
was not obvious, the researcher used the interviewee's assessment of the company's
orientation.
b. Participation
The researcher wanted to identify how important the use of Section 845
Authority was in the contractors' decision to respond to the solicitation; if the COSSI
experience was a positive one; if the contractor would participate in another agreement
crafted with Section 845 Authority; and how they found out about the solicitation.
c. Effectiveness
Elements of effectiveness, for the purpose of this thesis, include speed of
negotiation, flexibility and level of decision-making. The researcher wanted to determine
if the contractor believed that the agreement crafted under Section 845 Authority was
more or less effective compared to other Government contracts. The discussion of
effectiveness also addressed the impact on relations with sub-contractors, if any, and
whether this effort could have been performed with a traditional type of contract.
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d. Program Administration
Program Administration, for the purposes of this thesis, is defined as the
level of involvement of Government players (oversight) and the number of required
reports. The intent of this portion of the interview was to determine if the contractor
believed that the administration of the COSSI agreement was different than the
administration of a traditional Government contract. An additional topic discussed as part
of Program Administration, was the similarity of the Section 845 Agreement to a
commercial contract.
e. Milestones
The researcher wanted to identify the level of Government involvement in
determination of milestones; the contractors' opinion of payable milestones as a payment
method; and the nature of payment problems, if any. For the purpose of this thesis, a
payment problem is defined as a payment which is in excess of 90 days after invoices
were forwarded to the payment office, or a situation in which further delay of payment
puts the firm at financial risk.
f. Intellectual Property (IP) and Data Rights
The intent of this portion of the interview was to identify the level and
nature of the contractors' concerns about IP and Data Rights.
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g. Cost Sharing
The researcher wanted to determine if the requirement to cost share was of
major concern or a burden to the contractors and if this requirement had impacted their
relations with the Government.
h. Transition from Stage I to Stage II
Because the transition from an OT to a standard procurement contract has
not been done before, the researcher wanted to determine what aspects were of greatest




The number of employees in each of the firms varied dramatically, from
approximately 10 in one firm, to several thousand in another firm. In order to determine
an appropriate and logical threshold for categorizing these businesses as either small or
large, the researcher referred to the Federal Acquisition Regulation [Ref. 20:19.102] and
compared the small business thresholds as identified by Standard Identification Code
(SIC). The researcher found that the products being developed under COS SI fell into
many different SIC codes and that the number of employees for the small business
threshold ranged from 500 to 1500.
Due to the small sample size and the large number of product categories
represented, the researcher chose to simplify categorization by selecting one measure for
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size determination. For purposes of this thesis, those companies with 500 and fewer
employees are considered a small business. Those companies with more than 500
employees are considered to be large businesses. (See Appendix A, COSSI 97
Participants and Projects)
b. Position and Level of Involvement of Points of Contact (POC)
The researcher also found a large variation in the positions that the POCs
held within the company. For example, when dealing with the larger firms, the
researcher generally interviewed the Director of Contracts or the Contract Administrator
responsible for the COSSI agreement. When dealing with the smaller firms, the
researcher generally interviewed the President, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Vice
President (VP) for Marketing. (See Appendix A, COSSI 97 Participants and Projects) In
all cases, the POC was very knowledgeable about COSSI but their level of involvement,
as determined by their position, varied greatly. For example, some participants were
involved in the business decision to respond to the COSSI solicitation; some participated
in the agreement negotiations; while others currently administer the agreement. The
researcher found this variability to be useful, in that it resulted in a more complete
response to the primary research question. But the researcher was unable to ensure that all
topics were addressed by each interviewee in the same level of detail.
Because of these variances in the size of the companies, the position and
background of the POCs, the researcher has not attempted to statistically analyze the
25
responses. Where possible, the researcher has quantified the responses. The responses
are presented below in a narrative format.
2. Responses
a. Background
The researcher found 19 of the 30 participants were traditional
Government contractors and 1 1 were non-traditional contractors. (See Appendix A,
COSSI 97 Participants and Projects)
(1) Traditional Contractors. Of the 1 9 traditional contractors,
1 5 were large businesses and four were small businesses.
(2) Non-traditional Contractors. Of the 11 non-traditional
contractors, three were large businesses and eight were small businesses.
b. Participation
(1) Importance of Section 845 Agreement. The researcher
found that 24 of 30 respondents believed that the use of a Section 845 Agreement was not
a factor in their decision to respond to the COSSI solicitation. Five respondents found it
to be very important and one respondent was not sure.
(a) Not Important. Nearly all respondents in this
category reported that they viewed COSSI as a "business opportunity" and would have
responded regardless of the contracting method. Generally this category of respondents
viewed the availability of funds as more important than contract type. "Dollars are
available, I'm going to go after it!" said one large, traditional contractor. Several of the
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contractors who weren't drawn by the Section 845 Authority, said that they had intended
to do similar projects or were involved in similar projects, so COSSI was simply a "good
fit." Although not specifically attracted by it, several considered Section 845 Authority
an added plus and were "interested in seeing how it worked."
(b) Very Important. The respondents in this category,
all small, non-traditional contractors, were adamant that the use of the Section 845 was an
important, if not the critical factor in their decision to respond to the solicitation. One
respondent declared, "This was a Godsend for this company." Another said, "By using
an OT, I was able to cut the negotiation time and my legal fees in half. I am a small
business, I would have stayed away without it."
Several of the respondents said that they would never have
been able to comply with all the FAR requirements in the time allotted, if a traditional
contract had been used.
(c) Unsure of Importance. One respondent for a large,
non-traditional firm said he was not sure if his firm would have responded had a typical
contract been used. "If an OT had not been used, we may not have bid. I'm not sure. But
the OT did provide real synergism with our commercial work—a great fit."
(2) Nature of the Experience and Willingness to Participate in
Another Agreement. The researcher found that 28 of 30 respondents were quick to say
that that their overall experience was positive and that with all other factors the same,
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would participate in another Section 845 Agreement. Two respondents were more
hesitant in their response but said that they would still participate in the future.
(a) A Positive Experience and Would Participate in
Another Agreement in the Future. Generally all the respondents in this category were
very pleased with the overall initiative and were quick to say so. One respondent, a
small, non-traditional contractor stated:
As a taxpayer I feel good about this. I feel this is a better way to do
business, we are really able to leverage the commercial base.... This type
of program needs to be supported and sponsored if the Government is
really serious about getting cutting edge technology.
(b) Qualified Responses. Both respondents in this
category are small, non-traditional contractors. One respondent classified his firm's
experience with COSSI as negative, but still felt that the agreement will work out in the
end. Therefore, he said, he would enter into another Section 845 Agreement, if the
opportunity presented itself.
The other contractor qualified his company's future
participation. "Yes, we would participate in another 845 Agreement. I think that this is a
more suitable way of doing business with the Government, provided that we all
incorporate Lessons Learned from the last round."
(3) Notification of the Solicitation. Just under half of the
respondents were unaware of how the company was first notified of the solicitation.
Responses from the remainder of the respondents were approximately equally divided
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among the following three methods: 1) they were alerted by the military customer; 2)
they "stumbled on to it" when a personal acquaintance or business connection mentioned
it; or 3) they were actively "snooping" and saw it on DARPA/DUAP's home page.
c. Effectiveness
Overall, the response was nearly unanimous that the agreement crafted
with Section 845 Authority was more effective than a typical contract. Specific elements
of effectiveness are addressed below.
(1) General Comment. A common theme throughout these
discussions was the influence of personality on the effectiveness of the Agreement.
Several contractors commented that the improved efficiency of the Agreements was due
to the personal effort of a few players, not necessarily as a result of the new contracting
vehicle itself. One large, traditional contractor summarized these feelings when he stated:
In my experience, Government contracting is a people business in which
the personalities and individual characteristics of the people involved in
the transaction will determine the level of trust and communication. The
Other Transaction may set the stage, but the performance of the actors will
determine the outcome.
(2) Ease of Negotiations. The response was nearly unanimous
that negotiations were much faster than with a traditional contracting method. Two
contractors stated that the negotiation process was slower due to inexperience of the
Government representatives.
(a) Improved Speed & Readability. Many respondents
in this category commented that the "negotiations took about half the time of normal
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negotiations." Several contractors commented on the improved readability of the Request
for Proposal and of the final agreement. "This was one of the easiest that I ever worked,"
was one response. A different contractor commented on the effects of the improved
readability:
This agreement is readable. You are able to take this to the business
leader, let them read it and then make a decision. Most of the time you
need an army of lawyers to interpret the contracts with the Government
and this really zaps the energy of the company.
(b) Inexperience. But the increased speed and
improved ease of negotiations does not mean that the negotiations were effortless, they
were not. Many contractors spoke in detail about the "pain" of negotiating an agreement
when neither party has done it before. One contractor said that, "DARPA is good at this,
but the [Service] personnel are not trained and are not comfortable."
(c) Decreased Speed. For these same reasons, at least
two contractors felt that the negotiation process was actually slower. One, a large,
traditional contractor said, "The learning curve was so steep. The contracting shop was
not familiar [with the Section 845 Authority] and was very cautious." The other, a small,
non-traditional contractor said, "No [it is not faster]. The Government side is unsure of
this new form and has reverted back to doing things the way it knows—the old way! The
safe way!"
(3) Flexibility. By far the majority of the contractors reported
increased flexibility. Some were very surprised that the Government was now able to do
business this way. Others commented that the increased speed and flexibility were driven
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more by personality, then by the contracting method. A minority of the contractors saw
no change or decreased flexibility.
(a) Increased. The most common example given of the
Government's flexibility was the restructuring of milestones. "Yes [more flexible], much
less restrictive. We have had two modifications. We simply sat down and agreed," said a
small traditional contractor. One large, non-traditional contractor who was also very
pleased with the flexibility, commented on how early the modifications began. "In fact,"
the contractor stated, "The day of the kick off celebration we had a modification! Not a
problem!" A small, non-traditional contractor described how the Agreement's flexibility
allowed them to keep the program on schedule.
A good example of flexibility is when we saw that we could prevent a
three-month delay by purchasing specialized test equipment earlier in the
program, before the first milestone. We had to modify the Agreement to
acquire the equipment accelerate the payment. It saved time and
prevented a three-month delay.
(b) No Change or Decreased. The researcher found that
a minority of the contractors did not see any increased flexibility. Again, problems were
attributes to the personalities involved, and not to the contract method. One small, non-
traditional contractor stated:
The Government is treating this contract just like a normal one. It is a
huge mess. They are asking for detailed costs, line item by line item. This
is directly contrary to the purpose of increasing flexibility.
(4) Level of Decision Making. There was no clear consensus
that the level of decision making had changed one way or the other. Approximately equal
numbers of contractors said it was lower, higher or about the same.
(a) Lower. A few respondents felt like the decision
making level was lower; that the Government representatives were more "empowered"
than normal. "Because it is more informal, decisions are made face to face." Others felt
like the fact that they were dealing with fewer people made them feel like the decision
making level was lower.
(b) Higher or No Change. Some respondents felt that
the newness of this contracting vehicle prevented too much autonomy. One small,
traditional contractor commented, "Our counterparts are very cautious, the world is
watching." Another small, traditional contractor saw no change. "Decision makers all
want to seek advice so the level of decision making has not changed. They do not want
to make a decision in a vacuum."
One contractor was frustrated with the inability of the
Government Representatives to make a decision early in the program, that he thought was
in line with the original Agreement. After several months, the contractor did get what he
had initially pushed for. As a result of this delay, he did not think the decision making
level had shifted. He stated, "If the decisions could have been made at a lower level then
I would have gotten what I wanted at the start of the program."
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(5) Relationships with Sub-contractors. The researcher found
that the respondents generally did not believe that the use of a Section 845 Agreement
impacted their sub-contractors. This is primarily due to fact that a majority of the firms
did not subcontract out major portions of their effort, most of the work is being
performed "in house." The few that did have significant sub-contractor generally saw no
change. In two instances, a significant change was noted.
(a) No change. One large, traditional contractor was
firm, "No change in relations to subs. We are the prime, you are the sub!". One small,
non-traditional contractor stated, "Relationship with the subs is out of the Government
control. Subs all see this a commercial contract, no difference [in our relations]. One
respondent did not categorize it as a significant change but said because they were not
required to provide detailed cost or pricing data, they were not requiring it of the subs.
(b) Significant Change. The two respondents in this
category did see a significant change. One respondent, a small, non-traditional contractor
flowed down the entire 845 to his subs. The other respondent, a large, traditional
contractor formed a consortium with another large, traditional contractor for the COSSI
Agreement. These two firms typically do business together but in the standard way. They
found that there was a significant change in their relationship. The researcher spoke to
only one of the two firms. The contractor stated:
It is a true collaborative effort....Very different than we've traditionally
done business.... Almost simultaneous with the negotiation we wrote the
articles of collaboration that defined our relationship. This ensured that all
parties are tied in together with respect to how to operate. This ensured
everyone had a warm and fuzzy!
(6) Feasibility of Using a Traditional Method of Contracting.
All of the traditional contractors said that they could have used a traditional contracting
method but that it would have taken longer to negotiate, required more documentation
and therefore cost more. The only contractors, who could not have used a traditional
contracting method, were small businesses that would not have responded if a Section
845 Agreement had not been used.
d. Program Administration
(1) Level of Government Involvement. The researcher found
that the majority of the respondents noted a significant reduction with regard to the level
of Government involvement in contractual matters. "Once the contract was negotiated,
that was it."
But on the technical side, the majority of the respondents stated
that the level of Government involvement had actually increased. A large, traditional
contractor stated, "The Government is much more involved, but less formally. We speak
more often." A different large, traditional contractor, also reported, "The Government is
very involved but less formally and in more depth." The majority of the contractors said
that it was to their advantage to ensure that the Government was as informed a possible,
"After all, we want them to buy it [the modification kit]."
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(2) Required Reports. The researcher found that in general,
contractors submitted a variation of monthly, quarterly, and annual status reports in
addition to milestone reports. Overall, there was little disagreement that the number of
required reports and data requirements were substantially less. A large, traditional
contractor stated: "The old way we'd have 43 items on the Contract Data Requirement
List (CDRL), now we have none! We do monthly reports, but no long data items." One
contractor stated that they have worked with the Government to minimize the reports and
have agreed those that are logically required, but no more.
However, since some of the reporting requirements are tied to the
number of milestones, those firms that had more milestones did not experience a
significant reduction compared to others with fewer milestones. One contractor with
more milestones reported that, "It hasn't been reduced as much as we had hoped."
Another voiced a common dilemma: "We had to try to balance the administrative work
required for milestone payments with our cash flow."
Although the reporting requirements were less than normally
required with a traditional contract, one large, traditional contractor was very concerned
about the Service's expansion of the reporting requirements:
The customer is very driven by the FAR and has actually expanded the
reporting requirements. They are trying to run this like a bureaucracy in
order to protect themselves. They really don't understand. If the people
running it understood the technology then they would back off.
(3) Similarity with Commercial Contracts. Less than half of
the respondents had participated in purely commercial contracts. Most of these
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respondents found some similarities and some differences with commercial contracts.
Because there is no standard commercial contract, it is impossible to compare them
across the board. Two contractors were particularly adamant in their opinions.
One, a small, non-traditional business said that this Agreement was
very similar to a commercial contract, "There is not a lot of overhead, like a commercial
contract." This same respondent liked the format and wording of the COSSI Agreement
so much that he has used parts of it in his more recent contracts with other commercial
firms.
The other adamant respondent, the same small, non-traditional
contractor which was quoted earlier as saying their COSSI Agreement was "huge mess,"
said there were no similarities between this Agreement and a commercial contract. He
emphatically stated, "It is a joke to call this [agreement] commercial like!"
(4) Relationship with the Government. Approximately half of
the respondents reported that they had better relations with the Government. A couple of
these respondents noted that although their relationship had improved, real change
requires time and experience. The remainder reported that there was no change to their
existing relationship with the Government. Only one respondent reported bad relations
with the Government.
(a) Better Relations. The respondents in this category
reported that their relationship with the Government was less formal; it was less
adversarial and therefore significantly better. "It is an easier relationship," reported one
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large, traditional contractor. Several of these same respondents attributed the improved
relations with the Government to the fact that the customer was more relaxed because it
was not using its own money. One small, non-traditional contractor stated: "They have
little to lose financially—it is not their cash on the line."
Several contractors felt like there was higher level of trust
because more responsibility was placed on the contractor. This feeling of increased
responsibility was especially high for those companies who had approached the military
customer with an idea for COSSI. One of these, a large, traditional contractor stated:
Our relationship has changed significantly. I attribute this partially to the
fact that the dollars came from somewhere else and because it was our idea
to do this. Because it was our idea, the [Service] has let us take the
technical lead. Letting us do this our way. Of course they are still very
involved but we are more autonomous. We accomplish more with fewer
resources!
Most contractors stated that the agreement was mutually
supportive, in that both parties had vested interests in the program's success. One large,
traditional contractor stated, "We work well together. Very cohesively...We involve the
Government because it impacts how we proceed. This is R&D, the outcome dramatically
impacts the next phase."
(b) Real Change Requires Time and Experience. A
couple of contractors noted that they have seen improvements in their relationship with
the Government but that real changes take time and require more experience. One large,
traditional contractor stated:
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This is new to both sides. There is some confusion about the operation of
the agreement.. . .1 am constantly having to remind my people not to call it
a contract. This is an agreement! An agreement is less formal, we do not
have to gird our loins when preparing for a conversation [with the
Government]. If we want to make a change to make it [the agreement]
better, then simply address the issue. There are cultural practices that have
developed on both sides of the fence that still separate us.
(c) No Change or Bad Relations. The respondents in
this category stated that their relations with the Government were the same. "No change
in our relations, [we've] always had good [relations]," stated a large, traditional
contractor. One small, non-traditional contractor [18] did not have a good relationship
with the Government; "They have not followed the intent of the solicitation."
e. Milestones
( 1 ) Level of Government Involvement. The researcher found
that 23 of 29 respondents felt that the Government was very involved in the
determination of milestones. The remaining six respondents, felt that the Government
was not involved in milestone determination.
(a) Very Involved. The most common description of
milestone determination was that the contractor first prepared them, and then the
Government reviewed and revised them. In most cases the revisions were acceptable and
the respondents felt like there was a good "give and take." One small, non-traditional
contractor voiced a common theme, "Milestones were developed jointly. We went back
and forth. Each side prevented the other side from reinventing the wheel." One large,
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traditional contractor stated that, "The PM came down with his technical reps and we sat
down and refined the initial milestones."
(b) Not Involved. A minority of the respondents stated
that the Government was not involved. According to one small, non-traditional
contractor: "The Government did not really help. We developed the milestones and sent
them to them. They accepted."
(c) Additional Comments. Several contractors stressed
the fact that a "prudent" number of milestones need to be identified. That is, reporting
requirements and payment requirements have to be logical. One large, traditional
contractor, expressed concern that he failed to do this and that after five months he has
yet to reach the first milestone, and has not been paid. "At least under a normal contract
you get progress payments."
At least two contractors stated that they had to significantly
restructure the milestones after the project was underway. One, a large, traditional
contractor stated, "They were put together in a big rush, a real time crunch. Should have
put more thought into it." The other, a large non-traditional contractor said, "14 days to
plan everything out is tough. We did not think of everything." Both contractors used the
Government's willingness to restructure the milestones as an example of improved
flexibility.
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One large, traditional contractor, whose project is mainly
software related, stated that it was very difficult to divide the product into milestones. "It
has been a major effort to put together intermediate milestones."
(2) Opinion of Payable Milestones. The researcher found that
the majority of the contractors felt like payable milestones were a good payment method.
Although, one small, non-traditional contractor commented that the structure of the
payment terms was a barrier to innovation.
(a) Positive. One respondent in this category, a large,
traditional contractor stated: "[Milestones are] much easier than being wrapped up in cost
accounting arrangements. [And are] also a fair way to do it." A different large,
traditional contractor expressed a common opinion, "[We were] able to shed excess
overhead, lowering the cost. It is much cheaper."
(b) Payment Terms Create a Barrier to Innovation. One
small, non-traditional contractor who had milestones scheduled every three months said
the system works "OK." But he saw the fact that payment is only for work completely
finished as a barrier to innovation:
Down side is that I can't get paid for partial work completed. If I want to
speed up the process and complete 70% [of the milestone] in less than 3
months, I have to wait until the other 30% are completed before receiving
pay. There is big difference between this and a commercial contract.
The only other area related to milestones that was identified
as negative was payment. These concerns are presented below.
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(3) Payment Issues. The researcher found that 13 of 30
respondents did not know if their firm had submitted an invoice or if there was a payment
problem. Of the remaining contractors, eight had payment problems. Of those that had
payment problems, three were large, traditional contractors and five were small, non-
traditional contractors.
(a) Cause and Extent of Problems. Nearly all of the
firms with pay problems attributed the delays to the Government's lack of familiarity
with the payment procedures for a Section 845 Agreement. One small, non-traditional
contractor said, "We had a snag on the first invoice. Not all the players were on board
with the new procedures. Not submitting a DD250 is very different." Another small,
non-traditional contractor stated that he nearly went broke waiting on payment. He also
attributed the delays to the inexperience of the Service and paying personnel. A different,
small, non-traditional contractor was more adamant; "Everything is disorganized.
Nobody understands this type of contract. It is all nice language but the road to hell is
paved with good intentions."
Some respondents attributed the payment delays to
inexperience on both sides, Government and contractor. For example, a small, non-
traditional contractor said, "We had our invoice in the wrong format and misunderstood
at first....We have resubmitted and everything is OK now." One small, non-traditional
contractor attributed lengthy delays for the first two milestone payments to the fact that
he was not receiving payment electronically.
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f. Intellectual Property (IP) and Data Rights
The researcher found that just over half of the respondents considered IP
and Data Rights to be a major concern. This is not to say that IP and Data Rights were
not an important issue for all participants; they are, especially in today's competitive
market. The explanation for this apparent contradiction is that the participant's level of
concern was driven by how they viewed their ability or the Government's ability to
protect their rights.
(1) Major Concern. The respondents in this category were
approximately equally divided among those who were concerned about protecting
existing rights and those who were concerned about protecting future rights.
(a) Protection of Existing Rights. One large, traditional
contractor stated a perspective shared by nearly all respondents in this category, "It is OK
for the Government to have rights but not on what we had already invested. Our
competitive edge is dependent upon not letting this type of information out to others." As
one small, non-traditional contractor stated, "We had the patent long before this
agreement and we are not willing to sacrifice it."
(b) Protection of Future Rights. The contractors in this
category stated that that the issue for them was not over IP and Data Rights developed
prior to the agreement. "We had a clear position. The technology we are using is
licensed to [name of the firm], so we would not disclose it," said one large, non-
traditional contractor. The main issue for these contractors was the delineation of rights
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for the items developed jointly under the Agreement. Rather than risk the Government
purposefully or inadvertently passing out their property, these respondents sought to
maintain control of the IP and Data Rights by very carefully delineating where the
Commercial and Government portions of the cost share would be spent. According to a
large, traditional contractor, "He who pays for it gets to keep it the rights." One small,
traditional contractor stated:
We want to retain rights for all proprietary designs. We don't want
Government R&D funds to be used there because we don't want
ownership to go to the Government. We asked [the System Command] to
buy hardware and manuals.
Another large, traditional contractor who felt that the issue
of IP and Data Rights was "huge," stated:
We had to ensure in the Statement of Work (SOW) to spell out specifically
which tasks we would do with our dollars and which tasks are to be done
with DARPA dollars. We have to protect what we do with our dollars and
apply DARPA dollars in other areas that weren't as critical.
For most of the respondents in this category, this delineation
process was tough. One large, traditional contractor stated, "...Because this was a
program that we were going to do anyway, with our own funds, we had to ensure that we
separated out what parts the Government had rights to—This was a big headache!"
But one large, traditional contractor did not feel this way. This
firm categorized the delineation process under this Agreement as easier than under a
traditional contract:
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We typically spend lots of time kicking around who owns what. There is a
real ownership problem. But under an 845, this is clear. Who is doing
what is easy to determine and, therefore, so is who owns what rights.
(c) Traditional Language. One respondent, a large,
traditional contractor, who categorized IP and Data Rights as a concern, stated: "We
wound up with language straight out of the DFARS. There was no [direct] reference
[specific] to DFARS clauses but lawyers on both sides were more familiar with DFARS
[wording] so we extracted that language."
(2) Little Concern. The majority of the respondents in this
category were not concerned because they had previously developed the item and owned
all IP and Data rights. "We had proprietary data going in and we protected that. Not
really an issue," said a small, non-traditional contractor. "The Government recognized up
front that any proposal submitted would contain information that typically is not public,"
said another large, non-traditional contractor.
Three respondents in this category stated that the Government
terms were acceptable. One, a large, traditional contractor stated, "The IP provisions were
fair and reasonable. We are used to doing business in this environment. Very standard."
One small, non-traditional contractor felt like the high user demand
for his item kept the issue of IP and Data Rights from becoming a major issue, "Not




The researcher found that the cost share percentage of funds provided by
the Government ranged from 94% to 32%. The researcher also found that 10 of the
contractors either did not know if cost sharing was a concern or did not answer the
question. Of the remaining 20 contractors, 12 did not have major concerns with cost
sharing and eight did.
(1) No Major Concerns. Nearly all respondents in this
category did not categorize cost sharing as a major concern, but agreed that any time you
contribute discretionary dollars it is an issue that has to be well thought out. "Not really
an issue, it was a small amount but at the same time anytime you spend profit dollars it is
an issue," said one large, traditional contractor. Many of the respondents stated that they
were planning on conducting this type of effort anyway, so contributing was not a major
concern. In fact, they viewed the Government's portion of the cost share as a
reimbursement. Many also saw contributing as a long-term investment. One small, non-
traditional contractor stated, "We do not expect to make any money now. Payback is in
the production."
(2) Major Concerns. The researcher found that the majority of
firms that categorized cost sharing as a major concern, did so because it involved the
expenditure of "discretionary funds." "A Corporation is in business to make money, not
give it away," said the respondent from a small, traditional contractor.
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Several firms, all small, non-traditional contractors,
intended their high percentage of cost sharing to be a sign of their interest. One
respondent stated, "We wanted to ensure that we got the contract, therefore our cost share
is so high. This is proof of our desire!" Two firms, both small, non-traditional
contractors stated that cost sharing was a burden and that it was difficult to get the
money.
At least one firm, a large, traditional contractor, was
concerned when they submitted their proposals that they had not contributed a large
enough portion of the cost share to be competitive. They were surprised when they were
selected. They were pleased that the share ratio was not mandated but rather judged in
relation to the expected cost savings.
(3) Positive Effects on Relationship with the Government. The
majority of respondents stated that the requirement to cost share had a very positive effect
on their relationship with the Government. No one responded that the requirement to cost
share had negatively impacted their relationship with the Government. Several
respondents saw cost sharing as the critical link in their relationship with the
Government. A large, non-traditional contractor stated: "For us cost sharing is a
validating point. After all, how confident could or should the Government be if they
were putting up 100%?"
Cost sharing was also viewed by nearly all respondents as a
means to apply leverage to ensure that they maintained control of IP and Data Rights.
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According to one large, traditional contractor, "He who pays for it gets to keep the
rights!" Several respondents stated that cost sharing had given them a voice in the
project. One small, non-traditional contractor said, "Yes, this [cost sharing] is a big
change. They can't tell us how to do it! We are using a teaming approach, forcing both
sides to work together!" Another small, non-traditional contractor stated:
If I don't like the way it is going, I can fix it. I have the authority to say
something to the Government if I don't like something. And I'll be
damned if I'll let anything foul this project up. Meet my needs or I'll get
out of it. I'm paying half the costs!
h. Transition
The researcher found that six of the contractors either did not know of
concerns related to the transition or failed to answer the question. Of the remaining 24
contractors, 17 did not have major concerns about the transition and seven did have major
concerns.
(1) No Major Concerns. A majority of the respondents in this
category were not concerned because they believed that the obligation to transition to
Stage II was shared with the Government. The remainder felt that the obligation was on
them to ensure that the transition occurred and that this was an acceptable risk. Although
the respondents in this category did not have "major" concerns about the transition, nearly
all expressed some concern about the possibility of Stage II not being funded. An
additional minor concern, voiced by several of the respondents, was the impossibility of
recouping their investment if Stage II production quantities declined
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(a) Shared Obligation. The respondents in this
category stated that they believed that if they met their obligation through achieving the
program's objectives, then the Government would meet their obligation. "We are
operating under the assumption that if we meet all the wickets as laid out, that we will get
the production contract," said one large, traditional contractor. This same contractor
voiced a common theme of mitigating any transition risk by working with the
Government. "It is in our inherent interest to work with the Government because they are
trying to secure funding for Stage II and a production guarantee."
(b) The Contractor's Obligation. The respondents in
this category stated that the burden of achieving the transition was on them. "The onus is
on us to get through to Stage II. This is no different than the commercial world. There
are no real promises," said one small, non-traditional contractor. Another small, non-
traditional contractor stated:
I'm in this with my eyes open, in commercial supply you take risks. I'm
hoping that at then end of Stage I, we demo the finished product and the
[Service] falls in love with it. But if the [Service] does not buy it, then
commercial customers will still want it.
(2) Major Concerns. The researcher found that four of the
seven respondents in this category were concerned about re-competition. The remainder
saw no benefit if the transition was not accomplished.
(a) Re-competition. These respondents were very
concerned about the possibility of the Government not being able to uphold its pledge of
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transitioning to Stage II without re-competing the projects. One large, traditional
contractor stated:
Regulations will force the Government to compete [Stage II] or my
competitors will put up a stink and force competition. This will cause
delay and result in lost time and lost resources. I believe that the
Government does not want to compete but it may have to. But if I have
done all that was required, at the required price, then I should get Stage II.
Now certainly I understand the funding issue, there may be no funds to go
to Stage II. But if there is money and I have met all the gates, and do not
get Stage II, then I will put in a claim. I MUST try to protect my
investment!
(b) No Benefit if not Transition. The respondents in
this category were very concerned that if they did not transition to Stage II that there was
little benefit in the program. One small, non-traditional business was adamant:
We have nothing to gain unless we are able to enter Stage II. That is our
carrot. Some of the larger companies will be able to turn around and go
directly commercial with the product at the end of Stage I. They will not
be hurt if Stage II falls through. We are a small business and can not do
this. We need some time to really get established. Stage II serves as this
time!!
A large, traditional contractor was also concerned that a
payoff in the future existed. He stated: "We have put dollars in. At the top of the
company they are anxious and want to make sure that there is something out there after
Stage I."
(3) General Comment. Several respondents spoke of the
Government's "non-compete" clause when transitioning from Stage I to Stage II as a real
incentive. One large, traditional contractor voiced a common theme when he said, "This
aspect certainly made the agreement more attractive! Puts a positive spin on it all
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[referring to having to provide cost share dollars.] Good carrot if we do what we are
supposed to do."
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the researcher's methodology and a general
categorization of responses around interview topics. The extreme variation in company
size, position and level of involvement of the POCs makes it impossible to statistically
analyze these responses, but it does not diminish the value of these data. These
subjective responses provide a variety of views that reflect a broad range of experiences.
These responses reveal the diversity of personalities and business situations that can best
be handled by an innovative tool like the Section 845 Authority. In the following
chapter, the researcher will analyze these results and identify the specific benefits and
limitations of each topic area.
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IV. ANALYSIS
This chapter provides an analysis of the results presented in Chapter III and
focuses on the specific benefits and limitations of each interview topic area. Where
appropriate, the researcher has highlighted the implications of these findings for a
Government organization preparing to use Section 845 Authority.
The Reader will find that many of the benefits are linked by common themes,
such as improved relationships and improved flexibility, and that several of the
limitations are linked by inexperience with Section 845 Agreements. The Reader will
also find that the use of Section 845 Authority requires the Government representatives to
have an in-depth knowledge of the program's objectives and requirements.
A. BACKGROUND
1. Benefits
• Broader Vendor Base
Eleven of the 30 contractors that participated in COSSI 97 were
contractors whose business processes are not oriented towards doing business with the
Government. This achieves one of the intended goals of Other Transactions (OT), that is
to attract non-traditional contractors. An expanded vendor base provides DoD with access
to new technology that is critical to maintaining its technological advantage. It also
provides the Government with a means to leverage off the larger pool of the privately
funded R&D efforts.
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One small, non-traditional contractor strongly concurred that the use of
Section 845 was attractive to non-traditional contractors and that a broader vendor base is
beneficial. "This is a much more efficient way to do business. Small and medium sized
businesses are full of creative juices that can be attracted by streamlining the system."
For the Government, access to these "creative juices" represents access to a broader range
of innovative and technologically advanced solutions for numerous problems, including
the reduction of O&S costs. It also provides DoD with the agility required to counter
unforeseen, technological threats.
2. Limitations
• More ofthe "Same Old Same Old"
Nineteen of 30 participants in COSSI 97 are traditional contractors who
are familiar with doing business with the Government. Although not confirmed, this may
fuel a perception among Congressional skeptics that this is simply a way around the rules.
The depth of this perception will become especially critical as the Congressional vote on
extending Section 845 Authority draws near.
• Expanded Vendor Base Not Yet Permanent
Although the number of non-traditional contractors participating in COSSI
97 is encouraging, there is no guarantee that the expanded vendor base is permanent. One
of the primary factors influencing this is the fact that none of the COSSI 97 projects have
overcome the hurdle of transitioning to Stage II. As will be discussed in Section H of this
chapter, the success of this transition and the ability of the Government to abide by its
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solicitation promises, will in large part determine the level of continued interest in the use
of Section 845 Agreements. Agencies planning to use Section 845 Authority must
carefully consider the implications of transitioning from "outside the FAR" to "inside the
FAR" and obtain appropriate waivers and exemptions, before issuing the solicitation.
Through prior planning, the Agency can gain the trust and confidence of the non-
traditional contractor.
A second factor influencing the uncertain permanency of the expanded
vendor base is the fact that the authority to use Section 845 is only temporary. Congress
will vote in 1999 to either extend or abolish its use. If Congress extends the use of the
Authority, it will also vote on whether to expand the Authority to include production.
Organizations and individuals that feel strongly about the use of Section 845 Authority
should take action to ensure that their Congressional representatives are aware of their
views, prior to the Congressional vote.
B. PARTICIPATION
1. Benefits
• May Lead to a Continued Relationship with the Government
Nearly all contractors have had a positive experience with COS SI 97 and
would consider entering into another Agreement crafted with Section 845 Authority.
This is especially significant for the non-traditional contractors, who are working with the
Government for the first time, and who would now favorably consider a "relationship"
with the Government.
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With an improved reputation among these contractors, the Government
has a unique opportunity to foster strong relationships and to inform the non-traditional
contractors about ongoing DoD acquisition reform efforts. The Government can also
encourage these "new" contractors to participate in other, more traditional endeavors.
This will help to ensure that long-term relationships are established and the vendor base
is expanded.
In effect, the Government can use Section 845 Agreements as a "hook" to
pull in non-traditional contractors and then improve their perception of doing business
with the Government. As discussed in Chapter III, some of the non-traditional
contractors expressed surprise that the Government was able to conduct business this
way. These small, non-traditional contractors never considered Government business
because they perceived the Government to be an adversarial customer erecting barriers to
their participation. One small, non-traditional contractor stated, "The old system was
prohibitive; it scared away the little guy." But these contractors are now inquisitive about
what other, "commercial like" initiatives the Government is undertaking. At least one
small, non-traditional contractor is already pursuing a second project with their COSSI
customer.
This discussion of establishing long-term relationships, may be helpful in
gaining Congressional support during the debates over extending the use of Section 845
Authority to include production.
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2. Limitations
• Contract Type Secondary to Business Opportunity
Twenty-four of 30 respondents believed that the use of a Section 845
Agreement was not a factor in their decision to respond to the COSSI solicitation. Nearly
all respondents in this category reported that they viewed COSSI as a "business
opportunity" that was in line with their firm's strategic goals or core competencies. They
saw a "fit" between what the Government wanted and what they wanted. In some cases
they intended to do the project anyway and saw this as means of getting reimbursed by
the Government for their effort. They were not interested in the contracting vehicle per
say, but were interested in the longer-term effects on their position in the market.
The Government, therefore, has to carefully construct innovative
initiatives that do not rely solely on the use of a new contracting method to attract
participants. It must consider all factors of the business decision-making cycle including
market trends, timing of the solicitation, and business structure of the target contractors.
This type of in-depth analysis may lead the Government to determine that in some cases
it is better to give the contractor the option of using a traditional method of contracting, in
lieu of a non-traditional method.
An example of where this may have been the case involves the large,
traditional contractor who considered their COSSI project to be an engineering change
proposal (ECP) to an item in production. This contractor may have been better suited to
perform the task using a traditional, more familiar contracting method. After all, the
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Government-approved systems were already in place. It is not known what the difference
in cost or schedule would have been if a traditional contracting method had been used;
however, in this particular case, the contractor could have avoided administrative
problems that arose as a result of inexperience with the Section 845 Agreement.
Several of the small, non-traditional contractors stated that the use of a
Section 845 Agreement was a critical factor in their decision to respond to the
solicitation. They contended that if a traditional method had been used, they could not
have obtained the required, Government-approved systems in the time allocated. It is not
known if additional time would have made a real difference. However, in some cases, it
may be advantageous to the Government to give a non-traditional contractor additional
time to respond to the solicitation. This additional time may be used by the contractor to
assess the compliance of their current systems, or by the Government to inform the




Nearly all contractors believed the use of a Section 845 Agreement was
more effective than a traditional contract because negotiations were quicker and
flexibility was increased.
The increased flexibility experienced by the majority of the participants
was in stark contrast to what the traditional contractors had experienced in previous
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contracts with the Government. One small, traditional contractor stated, "We have been
able to operate in the essence and spirit of the agreement as opposed to simply complying
with lists of FAR clauses." This increased effectiveness leads to less wasted effort and
more "bang" for each Government dollar invested. Several contractors stated that in a
R&D effort, where the outcome and path to the goal are not known, this type of
flexibility is essential. As one small traditional contractor said, "This is R&D, the
outcome [of Stage I] dramatically impacts the next phase [Stage II]."
From a larger perspective, it is also possible to say that the use of Section
845 Authority was more effective because some of the small, non-traditional contractors
would not have participated under a traditional procurement method.
2. Limitations
• Dependence on Innovative Agreements Officers
Several of the respondents attributed effectiveness issues, both positive
and negative, to the people involved and not solely to the use of an innovative contracting
tool. One large, traditional contractor expressed a common opinion that, "The OT may
set the stage but the performance of the actors will determine the outcome."
The intent of OTs was to improve procurement efficiency by removing the
dependence upon regulations and allow Government and contractor representatives to
reach an agreement that makes common sense and satisfies both parties. Therefore, the
responsibility to reach an agreement that balances the Government's risk with perceived
value, is on the shoulders of the Agreements Officers. Operating outside of the safety of
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the acquisition regulations is directly contrary to the Government culture of avoiding risk.
It is not easy to find individuals who feel secure operating in this "regulation-free" realm
and to find Government organizations, outside of DARPA, that readily support this level
of innovation.
An Agency preparing to use a Section 845 Agreement must realize from
the start that the success of program is dependent upon the people it selects to represent it.
It must choose its representatives carefully, selecting individuals who are trained and
naturally innovative. Because innovation is the most difficult characteristic to find, and
can not necessarily be improved with additional resources, this should be the basis for
representative selection.
An Agency should look for individuals who have shown innovation in
using the traditional system and "think outside the box." Ideally, it would find
individuals who have commercial contracting experience. A large, traditional contractor
was in a unique position to evaluate the value that an Agreements Officer with
commercial experience brings to the process. This particular contractor had two
Agreements with two different Agreement Officers, one with commercial experience, the
other without. The contractor was adamant that the Agreements Officer who had
commercial experience was much more flexible. "She was able to think outside of the
normal bounds and move the Agreement to where it needed to be. The Agreement went
much smoother."
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An Agency considering the use of a Section 845 Agreement must provide
broad training for its representatives so that they understand the contracting tool and can
apply it effectively. Training should not be limited to the statutory aspects of the
Authority but should include an in-depth explanation of the purpose and intent of using a
Section 845 Agreement. A small, non-traditional contractor underscored the importance
of this training, stating, "It is essential that more contract/legal officials are trained to
think and act different from traditional FAR contracts." One small, non-traditional
contractor complained that the intent of the Agreement was not understood and therefore
it was handled like a traditional contract. A large, traditional contractor was also
concerned because he also felt that the intent of the Agreement was violated when
additional reporting requirements were expanded.
The customer is very driven by the FAR and has actually expanded the
reporting requirements. They are trying to run this like a bureaucracy in
order to protect themselves. They really don't understand. If the people
running it understood the technology then they would back off.
Because the effectiveness of the Section 845 Agreement appears to be
influenced by the capabilities and training of the individuals involved, in some instances,
if the "right people" are not available, then the use of a traditional contracting method
may make more sense.
All respondents who stated that the use of Section 845 Agreement was not
an important element in their decision to respond to the solicitation, also said that they
could have used a different, more traditional method of contracting. The majority of the
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respondents who felt this way agreed that the effort probably would have taken longer,
required more paper work and therefore, cost more.
A Cost/Benefit analysis of a Section 845 Agreement vs a traditional
contract was not part of this research, but an Agency considering the use of a Section 845
Agreement should consider conducting such an analysis. The depth of the analysis
should be tailored to the situation and take into account the experience of the contractor,
the cost share ratio (if any), the complexity of the item and the intended use of the item.
Although it may be difficult to accurately determine the real costs and benefits of a
Section 845 Agreement, an Agency considering its use must consider the tradeoffs, prior
to a final decision on the contracting method.
• No Change to the Level ofDecision Making
There was no clear consensus among the respondents that the level of
decision-making had changed. Most cited the lack of experience as a barrier that
prevented the Government representatives from being or feeling empowered. One large,
traditional contractor stated, "No change in the level of decision-making. For the most
part, people are very cautious." The lack of experience and unfamiliarity with the
agreement is a barrier that should come down with continued use. As these agreements
become common, more people will be accustomed to using them and will be encouraged
by precedence. One large, non-traditional stated:
Because this is a new method of contracting there is little precedence
relating to contract issues. Because of this, I sense timidity on the part of
Contracting Officers when it comes to resolving contractual matters.
Precedence would start to delineate what can and can not be done.
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An Agency employing a Section 845 Agreement can foster decision-
making at the lowest levels by rewarding quick, sound decisions. The Agency must
create a climate that supports innovation and ensure that the lessons learned from their
previous agreements are properly disseminated.
D. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION
1. Benefits
• Improved Informal Relationships between Contractor and
Government Representatives
Approximately half of the respondents reported that because the
relationship with the Government was less formal; it was less adversarial and therefore,
their relationship was significantly better. "We work well together, very cohesively,"
said a small, traditional contractor. The respondents also indicated that this improved,
informal relationship translated into increased communication which would likely result
in a product that better satisfies both their needs. Additionally, increased, informal
communications provides for early notification of problem areas, generally resulting in
less expensive, more quickly achieved solutions. And because each side is better
informed, expensive layers of bureaucracy, including formal reports, can be eliminated.
Increased, informal communications is therefore more cost effective and contributes
significantly to the perception that a Section 845 Agreement permits the participants to do
more with fewer resources.
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2. Limitations
• May Be More Manpower Intensive
As stated above, increased, informal involvement certainly is beneficial in
that it improves communications. However, Agencies using or preparing to use a Section
845 Agreement must understand and assess related workload implications. A majority of
respondents noted that there was a significant reduction of Government involvement
concerning contractual matters, but when it came to technical issues, the level of
Government involvement actually increased. A large, traditional contractor stated a
common perception, "The Government is very involved but less formally and in more
depth." It appears that reduced reporting requirements are forcing greater personal
contact by individuals performing under the Agreement. With the number of Federal
employees continuously decreasing, the level of involvement that is required on a Section
845 Agreement may be difficult to sustain. A decreased level of involvement may
prevent or hinder the Government/Contractor relationship.
E. MILESTONES
1. Benefits
• Good Program Planning and Information Exchange
The majority of respondents felt that payable milestones were a good
payment method and believed that the Government was sufficiently involved in milestone
determination. COSSI participants generally found that early, joint involvement in
milestone determination facilitated the exchange of information, cutting down on
62
redundancy and helping the program to stay focused. One small, non-traditional
contractor who was pleased with the sharing of information during the milestone
formulation commented: "The milestones were developed jointly. We went back and
forth. Each side prevented the other side from reinventing the wheel."
Joint milestone determination allowed both sides to voice their concerns
early in the program, at a time when influencing the direction of the project was possible
at a lower cost. One small, traditional contractor spoke of the exchange of information
that occurred at the first milestone briefing:
[The] first milestone was a design review. We educated [the Government
Representatives] on the capabilities of the system. They were telling me
how we were going to integrate into the system. There were many
suggestions. We accepted some that delayed the program. Of course there
was no problem with an extension.
2. Limitations
• Payment
Roughly a quarter of the participants in COS SI reported that they had
payment problems. Most attributed the problems to the fact that many individuals in the
Government payment administrative system are unfamiliar with the unique payment
procedures for a Section 845 Agreement. "After all, it is very different. No DD250 and
all," stated one large, traditional contractor.
Payment problems become a critical limitation because they can over-
shadow all other benefits. Fortunately, as the use of these agreements becomes more
common, individuals involved in the process will gain experience. To help mitigate any
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problems and limit delays, an Agency involved in a Section 845 Agreement must be
proactive and do as much coordination as is possible, prior to the submission of an
invoice. It can also employ more innovative, flexible payment methods based on the
contractor's specific needs.
An additional payment limitation raised by one small, non-traditional
contractor is that milestone payment is only for work that is completely finished.
[The] down side is that I can't get paid for partial work completed. If I
want to speed up the process and complete seventy percent [of the
milestone] in less than three months, I have to wait until the other thirty
percent are completed before receiving pay.
This contractor viewed this limitation as a barrier to innovation. He was
adamant that in the commercial world you get paid for what you do. An Agency
planning to use a Section 845 Agreement may want to establish flexible payment options
within the milestones, in order to encourage innovation and promote early project
completion. Once the Government payment administration system becomes accustomed
to the Section 845 payment procedures, an increased number of payments should not be
an issue.
F. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP) AND DATA RIGHTS
1. Benefits
• Perceived Flexibility Increased Confidence and May Have
Increased Participation
IP and Data Rights were an important issue for all participants, even for
those that said it was not a major concern. The explanation for this apparent
64
contradiction is that the participant's level of concern was driven by how they viewed
their ability or the Government's ability to protect their rights, not what the intrinsic value
of the rights were. In other words, no participant would deny that IP and Data Rights are
important in today's competitive. But contractors, who were confident that the
Government would honor their IP or Data Rights for a previously developed item, did not
consider it to be a major concern while negotiating their COSSI Agreement. Their
confidence was expressed by a small, non-traditional contractor; "We had proprietary
data going in and we protected that. Not really an issue."
The contractors' confidence stemmed from the fact that the Government's
stated position regarding IP and Data Rights was one of flexibility. More specifically, the
Government's position, regarding the allocation of rights and grants of licenses for IP
developed during Stage I, was one of negotiation. [Ref. 29:p. 5.0] The Government also
stated that it would negotiate rights and licenses with regard to patentable inventions,
although the Government's going in position would be the same as if the Bayh-Dole Act
were applicable. [Ref. 29 :p. 5.0] And finally, with regard to technical data, the
solicitation stated: "We are not interested in obtaining any special Government rights in
proprietary technology for the interested kit or in the underlying commercial product or
process." [Ref. 29:p. 5.0]
The reality or depth of the Government's flexibility regarding IP and Data
Rights is unknown. A comparison of the IP and Data Rights negotiated as part of these
Agreements with those that would have been mandated under the provisions of the Bayh-
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Dole Act, or which would have typically been achieved in negotiation with the
Government, was not part of this research. Even if the terms in all three cases were found
to be very similar, this would not change the fact that approximately three-fourths of the
contractors perceived that the Government's flexibility allowed them to protect their
existing rights.
This perception is critical, especially when dealing with IP and Data
Rights because these are the "life blood" of a firm. No company is going to willingly
sacrifice its rights. The contractor's perception of Government flexibility may have
resulted in increased participation.
2. Limitations
• Delineation Requires Foresight
Approximately one quarter of the respondents were very concerned about
protecting future rights of items developed during COSSI. In order to maintain control,
they very carefully delineated where the commercial and Government portions of the cost
share would be spent. As one large, traditional contractor stated, "He who pays for it gets
to keep the rights."
This strict delineation of IP and Data Rights, based on who pays for a
specific work effort, requires that Government representatives thoroughly understand the
composition of the item, its intended use and anticipated future uses. This very strict
analysis and thorough understanding may not always be possible, given the personnel or
time available. The Government may in turn, "give away" more rights than it intended.
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In most cases, an error of this sort will have little impact because the Government very
often does not need extensive rights. However, the retention or granting of IP and Data
Rights should be made from an informed position, and not haphazardly. An Agency
preparing to use a Section 845 Agreement must anticipate the level of delineation
required and be properly prepared to negotiate appropriate IP and Data Rights.
G. COST SHARING
1. Benefits
• Improved Government/Contractor Relationships
The majority of the respondents stated that the COSSI requirement to cost
share had a positive effect on their relationship with the Government. Most of the
respondents in this category believed that cost sharing had given both parties a stake in
the effort, and therefore had encouraged frank communication. Many also said that cost
sharing prevented one side from telling the other how to do the work, and as a result, they
worked more closely together. A large, traditional contractor commented on the leveling
effect of cost sharing: "The Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) had the habit of falling
into the 'We Are The Customer, Listen To Us' role. Of course, we quickly pointed out
that we had put up half of the funds. Then we could talk."
This improved relationship has helped to keep the effort on track and
ensured that the project is meeting the requirements of both the Government and the
contractor. A large, traditional contractor stated, "We have worked together and
developed the project together, to ensure that we get exactly what we want."
67
2. Limitations
• May be Difficult to Determine Government Return on Investment
(ROI)
The Government percentage of the cost share ranged from 94% to 32%.
With such a wide variation, it is important for the Government to understand the
implications of where and how its portion of the cost share is being applied. For
example, is the contractor's 6% being applied to the technologically advanced areas that
have future potential value, and the Government's 94% being applied to the other areas?
If so, then what is the Government's return on investment (ROI)? It may be that the
future O&S cost savings are so significant over a 10-year period that the Government
ROI will far exceed its cost share, and that giving the contractor all rights to the
technology is therefore an appropriate step. It is impossible to make a generic statement
that would fit all scenarios, but it is appropriate to advise agencies preparing to use a
Section 845 Agreement to carefully analyze the Government's ROI.
• May Limit Participation by Smaller Contractors
Two respondents, both small, non-traditional contractors, stated that cost
sharing was a burden and that it was very difficult for them to come up with their portion.
The continued requirement to cost share may create a barrier that will limit participation
by small contractors. If this happens, it could eliminate an important segment of
innovative firms for which OTs were intended.
An Agency preparing to use a Section 845 Agreement must be aware that
cost sharing is not a Congressionally mandated requirement; it does not have to use it if it
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is not appropriate. The Agency should construct the terms of the Agreement such that the
benefits of cost sharing are balanced with the potential negative effects. It may require
greater flexibility in determining what constitutes an appropriate cost share contribution
but must also take into account the Government's expected ROI.
• Uncapped Cost Share May Put Smaller Contractors in Financial
Jeopardy
The fact also that the Government portion of the cost share is capped,
while the contractor portion is not, may place some of the smaller contractors in financial
jeopardy. At least two of the COSSI 97 participants complained that unforeseen costs
had driven their cost share significantly over what they had projected. One of the firms, a
large, traditional contractor, whose cost share has increased 1 00%, admitted that they had
under-bid but did not know that it would cost this much. The other, a small, non-
traditional contractor, did not state the nature of the overruns. Fortunately, neither
company is in danger of going out of business, and both still believe that it was
worthwhile to stay with the project. But, each indicated that the stakes for transitioning
to Stage II were now significantly higher.
It is important to remember that Section 845 Authority is currently
permitted only for the development of prototypes. Prototype development is inherently
risky, even in a case like COSSI that involves the modification of a commercial item. It
is easy to envision a situation in which a smaller company, with limited resources, could
have difficulty meeting its obligations. The increased, informal communications that
typically accompany the use of a Section 845 Agreement should allow for the early
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detection of financial problems. But it may be necessary to adjust the milestones to
increase cash flow or alter the program to reduce total expenditures. An Agency
considering the use of a Section 845 Agreement should carefully weigh the benefits of
cost sharing, the financial ability of the firm to pay, and the probability of an over run.
H. TRANSITION FROM STAGE I TO STAGE II
1. Benefits
• Encouraged Participation
The solicitation issued by DUAP specifically stated that if a contractor is
selected to proceed to Stage II, then the purchase of the modification kits is to occur
without re-competition, at a fair and reasonable price based on an analysis of the value of
the kits to the acquiring Service. According to COSSI training materials used by DUAP,
the initiative was structured this way in order to offer the contractor an incentive to cost
share and to protect the contractor's investment. It was also intended to help the Services
get the modification kits into the field faster.
The researcher did not initially intend to determine how important the
terms, for the transition from Stage I to Stage II, were in the participant's decision to
respond to the COSSI solicitation. However, several firms commented that this aspect of
the agreement was a selling point that persuaded them to pursue this business
opportunity. One large, traditional contractor stated, "This aspect certainly made the
agreement more attractive." There was a strong feeling among these contractors that this
was an appropriate balance to the cost sharing requirement. In effect, they viewed the
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terms of the transition as their payoff after a difficult contribution. A large, traditional
contractor commented: "Put a positive spin on it all. Good carrot! If we do what we are
supposed to and meet our goals; then the [Service] is committed to buy [the modification
kit]."
• Encouraged Teamwork Between the Government and Participants
Many of the participants stated that the open option for the Government to
award Stage II helped to ensure cooperation and teamwork. One small, traditional
contractor commented: "The contractor is obliged to perform better. We want the
Government to buy this at Stage II." A large, traditional contractor agreed that teaming
with the Government was the best way to ensure that they would proceed to Stage II. "It
is our inherent interest to work with the Government because we are trying to secure
funding for Stage II and a production guarantee."
2. Limitations
• Terms ofthe Transition Not YetApproved
The COSSI training materials emphasize that the key to not re-competing
Stage II is the establishment of target price prior to starting Stage I. The rationale is that
the Competition and Contracting Act (CICA) requirement for full and open competition
is satisfied if the target price is established as a result of a competitive solicitation,
selection and negotiation process. The target price is to cover all deliverables, and is to be
the price which is expected to be considered "fair and reasonable" at Stage II. [Ref. 42]
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This approach is problematic for several reasons: 1) the Government is
creating a sole-source situation through its own actions; 2) establishing an accurate target
price for production items in advance of developing a prototype is difficult; and 3)
competition requirements for Stage II do not apply to Stage I. The DoD and the Services
have recognized that there are issues concerning competition, which were not considered
during the crafting of the initiative, and which could become the basis for legal protests
by non-COSSI firms that feel that they are being unfairly excluded from competing for
Government business. The Government is pursuing various strategies to mitigate this
risk. The most common approach being considered is to request Congressional approval
for a sole-source purchase. The researcher did not determine if any Service has submitted
a request but Congressional approval is not guaranteed.
Only a few of the Contractors were aware that the COSSI terms of
transition were a high-level issue. One large, non-traditional contractor was very
concerned about the issue. He stated:
In effect this is to be a sole-source procurement for Stage II. Other
companies are going to raise a fuss, saying that they can provide similar
products and that they did not have an opportunity to bid. I envision a
steady stream of protests. I don't see any reason why an exemption for
sole-source will apply.
A large, traditional contractor who was also aware of the potential
problems was not as forgiving:
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Regulations will force [the Government] to compete or my competitors
will put up a stink and force competition. This will cause a delay and
result in lost time, which equals lost resources. I believe the Government
doesn't want to compete this but it may have too. But if I have done all
that was required at the required price, then I should get Stage II. ...If
there is money and I have met all the gates and don't get Stage II, then I
will put in a claim. I must try to protect my investment.
Agencies preparing to use Section 845 Authority must carefully consider
the implications of transitioning from prototype to production and obtain appropriate
waivers and exemptions, before issuing the solicitation.
• Potential to Destroy Long-term Relationships and Threaten the
Entire Initiative
If DUAP is forced to compete Stage II, the transition will be delayed, but
the financial impact on many of the contractors may not be that severe. Some contractors
will be able to market their product to the commercial sector or other Services with little
modification. Approximately one fourth of the respondents are not counting on a
guaranteed transition to Stage II. "I'm in this with my eyes open, in commercial supply
you take risks," said one small, non-traditional contractor.
For other Stage I contractors, the effects of competition will be mitigated
by the fact that they will have a clear advantage over other competitors and will probably
win the competition. However, this may not always be the case. For example, a small
contractor participating in Stage I, who has an innovative, marketable product, may
attract the attention of large, traditional contractors. These large players may be able to
gather the resources on short notice to offer stiff competition. One small, non-traditional
contractor is currently very concerned that this scenario is unfolding.
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[The Transition is a] Huge Concern! I consider our program to be a major
success; perhaps too much so in that we have drawn a lot of attention. The
big guys, [He listed two large, traditional contractors] are very interested
in entering our field. Competition is on the rise. Lots of outside pressure
to ensure that the Government does not exercise its Stage II option and
that they compete Stage II. Rumor is that the Congressional
Representatives from the big players are applying pressure. I am a small
guy but I am using my contacts to fight back.
In most cases, the actual effects of the Government opening Stage II to
competition will probably be minimal; however, the impact on the contractors' perception
of the COSSI initiative may be very great. The majority of the contractors are not aware
that the Government has concerns over Stage II; they may view any changes to the terms
of the transition as a breach of trust. Since they have been operating under the
assumption that if they meet their obligation by achieving the program's objectives, they
expect the government to meet its obligation. One large, traditional contractor put it quite
simply: "We are operating under the assumption that if we meet all the wickets as laid
out, we will get the production contract."
The impact of this breach will be particularly severe for those small, non-
traditional contractors who will see this as a typical self-serving, Government action.
One small, non-traditional contractor will be particularly hard hit:
We have nothing to gain unless we are able to enter Stage II. That is our
carrot. Some of the larger companies will be able to turn around and go
directly commercial with the product at the end of Stage I, so they won't
be hurt if Stage II falls through. We are a small business and can not do
this. We need some time to really get established. Stage II serves as this
time!
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The Government's credibility with these contractors will be strained and
possibly lost. It will be much more difficult for the Government to "get on the shoulders
of industry," as Perry suggested, if industry can't trust the Government to uphold its
innovative agreements.
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the interview topic areas and identified specific
benefits and limitations within each. Based upon these findings, the following chapter
presents conclusions and recommendations; provides answers to the research questions;
and gives areas for further research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This final chapter presents the researcher's conclusions and makes
recommendations for an Agency using or preparing to use Section 845 Authority.
Additionally, a section of this chapter is devoted to summarizing answers to each of the
research questions presented in Chapter I and to identifying areas for follow-on research.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following is a consolidation of the findings detailed in Chapter IV. The
Reader will see that the participants in COSSI 97, generally found Section 845
Agreements to be effective tools, allowing for improved relationships with the
Government and giving the Government more "bang" for its investment. And the Reader
will also see that the full potential of the Authority can be best achieved by innovative,
trained Agreements Officers who are thoroughly knowledgeable about the program's
objectives and requirements.
1. Benefits
The use of Section 845 Agreement has resulted in an expanded vendor base; 1 1 of
the 30 participants were non-traditional contractors and six of these would not have
responded if a traditional contracting method had been used.
Section 845 Agreements were more effective than traditional contracting methods,
in that negotiations were quicker and flexibility was dramatically increased. This
increased effectiveness led to less wasted effort and more "bang" for each Government
dollar invested.
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When using a Section 845 Agreement, communication between the Government
and the contractor increased, because the relationship was less formal and information
exchanges occur more frequently. Joint milestone determination also enhanced
communication, because it provided an avenue for the early exchange of information and
good program planning.
The relationship between the Government and the contractors also improved
because there was a feeling of mutual dependence, fostered by the requirement for cost
sharing and by the open option for the Government to award the Stage II. These aspects
of COS SI 97 gave each side a stake in the effort and encouraged frank communication,
cooperation and teamwork.
Flexibility with regard to Intellectual Property (IP) and Data Rights, under a
Section 845 Agreement, increased contractor confidence that they could protect existing
and future rights, and resulted in increased participation.
2. Limitations
The permanency of this expanded vendor base is not guaranteed; it is dependent
upon the Government's ability to establish long-term relationships with non-traditional
contractors. This can, in part, be accomplished by the Government abiding by its
promises as set forth in the COSSI solicitation. The Government's failure to ensure the
smooth, sole-source, transition from Stage I to Stage II may threaten this initiative; and
may thwart future innovative initiatives that seek to attract non-traditional contractors.
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Many participants attributed effectiveness issues to the people involved, and not
solely to the use of the innovative contracting method. This requires that the Government
select for its representatives only those individuals who are naturally innovative and
trained in the intent of the Agreement.
The use of a Section 845 Agreement requires the Government representative to
have thorough knowledge of the program's objectives and requirements in order to
perform the difficult tasks of delineating IP and Data Rights; conducting a Cost/Benefit
Analysis; and determining the Government's return on investment (ROI). Government
representatives must be aware that the increased, informal involvement, with less
emphasis on formal reports, may require additional Government personnel to sustain.
Inexperience with Section 845 Agreements has limited the Government
representatives from being or feeling empowered; so the COS SI participants saw no
noticeable shift in the level of decision-making. Inexperience or unfamiliarity with the
payment process for a Section 845 Agreement also caused payment delays for some of
the participants.
A couple of small, non-traditional contractors perceived cost sharing as a burden.
This perception is a potential barrier that may limit participation in the future. The
uncapped cost share for contractors could also place smaller contractors in financial
jeopardy if the effort has large, unexpected cost overruns.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Provide Follow-on Training for Non-traditional Contractors
An Agency currently using a Section 845 Agreement can effect the expansion of
the vendor base by creating an environment that will foster long-term relationships with
non-traditional contractors. This can be achieved by providing the contractor with
follow-on training that focuses on the latest DoD acquisition reform efforts and the
inherent, but overlooked, flexibility of the FAR. Training of this nature should include a
thorough review of the FAR Guiding Principles.
2. Perform a Thorough Analysis of All Appropriate Contracting Methods
An Agency that believes that the use of a Section 845 Agreement may be
appropriate for a particular project must carefully analyze all possible acquisition
methods. It should avoid being locked into one method simply because it requires the
least regulatory conformance. It must consider the potential contractors and the status of
their accounting and reporting systems; the innovative nature and training levels of the
personnel available; and work load implications.
3. Select Innovative Agreements Officers
An Agency considering the use of a Section 845 Agreement must ensure that it
has the appropriate people for the job. Ideally, these individuals would have commercial
contracting experience, but in the absence of this very specific experience, it must select
individuals who function well with little supervision and who have shown innovation in
using the current system.
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4. Provide Broad Training to all Participants
An agency preparing to use or currently using a Section 845 Agreement must
provide broad training to its representatives, including Defense Contract Management
Command (DCMC), Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS), and other
Government Agencies involved in the Agreement; as well as to the contractors involved.
This training should address specific concerns of the particular project but also include an
in-depth explanation of the purpose and intent of using the Section 845 Agreement.
5. Conduct a Thorough Cost/Benefit Analysis
Prior to using Section 845 Authority, an Agency must thoroughly understand the
implications of its use. A useful tool for doing this is a Cost/Benefit Analysis. This
analysis should consider experience level of the contractor; the level of the Government's
cost share (if any); the areas to which the Governments portion of the cost share will be
applied; the complexity of the item; and the intended use of the item.
6. Document and Disseminate Lessons Learned
Documented and widely disseminated lessons learned are a source of precedence
and provide a basis for quick, sound decisions at the lowest levels. Agencies that
emphasize the documentation and dissemination of Lessons Learned create a climate that
supports innovation and will help to ensure the success of their Agreement.
7. Consider Creative Payment Methods
When constructing a Section 845 Agreement, look for creative methods of
payment that are most suitable for the contractor's situation and which provide
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appropriate incentives. A possible example of this is flexible payment options within
each milestone.
8. Plan in Advance for the Transition
An Agency preparing to use a Section 845 Agreement must carefully consider the
implications of transitioning from "outside the FAR" to "inside the FAR," and obtain
appropriate waiver and exemptions before issuing the solicitation.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are Section 845 Agreements?
Reference: Chapter II
Legislation in 1989, which was codified at 10 U.S.C. 2371, gave DARPA the
authority to "enter into transactions other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and
grants." [Ref. 43] DARPA has interpreted the statute to mean that OTs are a class of
transactions outside the procurement and assistance laws and regulations including the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) or other laws and regulations specific to the procurement system.
[Ref. 15: p. 35]
In 1 993 Congress amended the original OT Authority to allow DARPA expanded
use of OTs under Section 845. As finally enacted, the statute authorized agreement
authority for military technology demonstrations and prototype projects. Section 845
Agreements require competition to be used to the maximum "extent practicable," do no
require cost sharing, and are not authorized to be used for production.
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Section 804 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 extended
the authority of Section 845 through September 30, 1999, and made it available to the
Secretaries of the Military Departments. For the purpose of this thesis, even the
expanded authority is referred to as Section 845 Authority.
2. What is the Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative
(COSSI) 1997?
Reference: Chapter II
COSSI is a pilot initiative developed by the Dual-Use Applications Program
(DUAP) to reduce Operations & Support (O&S) costs by inserting commercially
developed products and processes into fielded military systems. COSSI is a two-stage
initiative. During Stage I, participants will conduct non-recurring engineering to create a
kit that can be inserted into a fielded military system. The contracting vehicle for Stage I
is Section 845 Authority. Stage II is the actual purchase of a reasonable production
quantity of kits, and the insertion of the kits into fielded military systems. Stage II will
be carried out using a traditional contracting method.
3. Was the use of a Section 845 Agreement a primary factor in attracting
firms to respond to the COSSI solicitation?
Reference: Chapter III
Twenty-four of 30 participants in the COSSI 97 reported that the use of a Section
845 Agreement was not an important factor in their decision to respond to the COSSI
solicitation.
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4. Were the firms selected for COSSI 97 Traditional or Non-traditional
Government contractors?
Reference: Chapter III
Nineteen of 30 COSSI 97 participants were traditional contractors. Of these 19, 15
were large businesses and four were small businesses. 1 1 of the 30 COSSI 97
participants were non-traditional contractors. Three of the 11 were large businesses and
eight were small businesses.
5. What benefits have the contractors found when participating in an
agreement crafted with Section 845 Authority?
Reference: Chapter IV
Benefits identified by the contractors include attracting a broader vendor base;
increased effectiveness; improved informal relationships between contractors and
Government representatives; improved relations based on cost sharing requirement; and
good program planning and information exchange based on milestone determination.
Additional benefits include the possibility of non-traditional contractors beginning
a long-term relationship with the Government and increased participation through greater
confidence with regard to IP and Data Rights.
6. What limitations have the contractors found when participating in an
agreement crafted with Section 845 Authority?
Reference: Chapter IV
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Limitations identified by the contractors include a dependence upon the
innovation of Agreements Officers; no change to the level of decision-making; payment
problems; possible limited participation by smaller contractors as a result of cost sharing
requirement; uncapped cost share may put smaller contractors in financial jeopardy; and
failure of the Government to follow through on solicitation promise may threaten entire
initiative.
Additional limitations include the perception that traditional contractors are using
Section 845 Authority as a way around the traditional procurement rules; uncertainty of
the expanded vendor base; a thorough analysis of contracting method is required;
traditional contracting methods could have been used; may be more manpower intensive;
delineation of IP and Data Rights requires foresight; determination of Government Return
on Investment may be Difficult; and terms of the transition from Stage I to Stage II are
not yet approved.
7. Based on their COSSI experience, would the contractors enter into another
Section 845 Agreement?
Reference: Chapter III and IV
All participants, except one, reported that they have had a positive experience
using a Section 845 Agreement under COSSI. All participants agreed that they would
participate in future Section 845 Agreements. One participant qualified his responses by
saying that they would participate in the future if Lessons Learned from previous
Agreements were incorporated.
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D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Differences in Negotiated Intellectual Property (IP) and Data Rights
Compare the IP and Data Rights negotiated under an Section 845 Agreement with
those that would have been mandated by the Bayh-Dole Act. Determine what differences
exist and how significant these differences are, given different scenarios.
2. Benchmark Commercial-Like Practices
Benchmark how commercial firms conduct Research and Development (R&D) to
determine if the "commercial-like" aspects of OTs are in fact commercial-like. Develop a
list of commercial-like practices that could be used in training Government
representatives.
3. Employment of Other Transactions (OT)
Examine the situations in which OTs have been used. Determine what
employment similarities and differences exist between Agencies. Determine the factors
that contribute to the successful employment of an OT and/or which prohibit the use of an
OT. Develop a tool, such as a decision matrix, to assist decision makers in determining
when the use of an OT is appropriate.
4. Vendor Base
Determine if non-traditional contractor who participated in an OT are continuing
to conduct business with the Government. Investigate the reasons why or why not the
vendor base is expanding or contracting. Determine what effect the use of Section 845
Authority is having on competition.
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5. Inherent Flexibility of Traditional Contracting Methods
Examine the use of OTs and determine if the project could have been carried out
using traditional contracting methods. Examine the level of flexibility that would have
been required if a traditional contracting method had been used. Determine what cultural
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Newco, Inc. E-2C Blade Inspection
Kit
• President Small Non-traditional
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Howell Instruments Test Cell Capability
















* For the purpose of this study, Small Businesses are categorized as those with less than
500 employees. Large businesses are those with 500 or more employees.
** For the purpose of this study, Traditional Contractors are defined as those whose
business processes are predominately oriented towards doing business with the
Government. Non-traditional Contractors are those whose business processes are
oriented towards doing business with the commercial sector.
*** Company Size and Category are unconfirmed
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(INSERT TITLE OF THE COMMERCIAL O&S SAVINGS INITIATIVE)
Agreement No.: MDA972-97-C-XXXX
Military Customer Funding document number:
Total Amount of the Agreement: $
Total Estimated Government Funding of the Agreement: $
Total Incremental Funding Available for Obligation: $
Effective Date of this Action:
Authority: 10 U.S.C. § 2371 and Section 845 of the 1994 National Defense
Authorization Act, as amended.
Line of Appropriation:
AA $
This Agreement is entered into between the United States of America, hereinafter called
the Government, represented by (INSERT MILITARY CUSTOMER) and (INSERT
COMPANY NAME) pursuant to and under U.S. Federal law.

















Scope of the Agreement
Term




















ATTACHMENT 1 Statement of Work
ATTACHMENT 2 Report Requirements
ATTACHMENT 3 Schedule of Payments and Payable Milestones
ATTACHMENT 4 Funding Schedule
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THIS PARAGRAPH(S) DESCRIBES THE VISION OF THE
PROGRAM AND SHOULD ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: WHAT IS
THE AGREEMENT ALL ABOUT? WHAT IS THE SYSTEM CURRENTLY
FIELDED? WHO IS THE MILITARY CUSTOMER? WHAT IS THE COMMERCIAL
PRODUCT BEING INSERTED? WHERE IS THE SAVINGS REALIZED AND OVER
WHAT PERIOD OF TIME? ARE THERE ADDITIONAL DUAL-USE (MILITARY
AND COMMERCIAL) APPLICATIONS BEYOND THE GOALS OF THIS
PROGRAM?
B. Scope
1 Company ABC (ABC) shall perform a research and development program
(Program) including test and qualification for insertion of a commercial product into an
existing military system described as follows:
(INSERT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT).
The research shall be carried out in accordance with the Statement of Work incorporated
in this Agreement as Attachment 1 . ABC shall submit or otherwise provide all
documentation required by Attachment 2, Report Requirements.
2. ABC shall be paid for each Payable Milestone accomplished in accordance
with the Schedule of Payments and Payable Milestones set forth in Attachment 3 and the
procedures of Article V. Both the Schedule of Payments and the Funding Schedule set
forth in Attachments 3 and 4 respectively may be revised or updated in accordance with
Article III.
3. The Government and ABC (Parties) estimate that the Statement of Work
of this Agreement can only be accomplished with an ABC aggregate resource
contribution of $ (INSERT DOLLAR AMOUNT) from the effective date of this
Agreement through (INSERT NUMBER OF MONTHS) ( ) months thereafter. ABC
intends and, by entering into this Agreement, undertakes to cause these funds to be
provided. ABC contributions will be provided as detailed in the Funding Schedule set
forth in Attachment 4. If either DARPA or ABC is unable to provide its respective total
contribution, the other Party may reduce its project funding by a proportional amount.
C. Goals / Objectives
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1.
The goal of this Agreement is (INSERT GOAL(S) OF AGREEMENT).
2. The Government will have continuous involvement with ABC. The
Government may also obtain access to research results and certain rights in data and
patents pursuant to Articles VII and VIII. DARPA and ABC are bound to each other by a
duty of good faith and best research effort in achieving the goals of the Program.
3. This Agreement is an "other transaction" pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2371 and
section 845 of the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act as amended. The Parties
agree that the principal purpose of this Agreement is for the Government to support and
stimulate ABC to provide its best efforts in the development of a commercial prototype
for insertion into fielded Department of Defense military systems. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Department of Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS)
apply only as specifically referenced herein. This Agreement is not a procurement
contract or grant agreement for purposes ofFAR Subpart 3 1 .205-1 8.
ARTICLE II: TERM
A. The Term of this Agreement
The Program commences upon the date of the last signature hereon and continues for
(INSERT NUMBER OF MONTHS) ( ) months. If all funds are expended prior to the
(INSERT NUMBER OF MONTHS) ( )-month duration, the Parties have no obligation
to continue performance. Provisions of this Agreement, which, by their express terms or
by necessary implication, apply for periods of time other than specified herein, shall be
given effect, notwithstanding this Article.
B. Termination Provisions
Subject to a reasonable determination that the program will not produce beneficial results
commensurate with the expenditure of resources, either Party may terminate this
Agreement by written notice to the other Party, provided that such written notice is
preceded by consultation between the Parties. In the event of a termination of the
Agreement, it is agreed that disposition of Data developed under this Agreement, shall be
in accordance with the provisions set forth in Article VIII, Data Rights. The Government
and ABC will negotiate in good faith a reasonable and timely adjustment of all
outstanding issues between the Parties as a result of termination. Failure of the Parties to
agree to a reasonable adjustment will be resolved pursuant to Article VI, Disputes. The
Government has no obligation to reimburse ABC beyond the last completed and paid
milestone ifABC decides to terminate.
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C. Extending the Term
The Parties may extend by mutual written agreement the term of this Agreement if
funding availability and performance reasonably warrant. Any extension shall be
formalized through modification of the Agreement by the Agreements Officer and the
ABC Administrator.
ARTICLE III: MANAGEMENT OF THE PROJECT (NOTE: THIS ARTICLE MAY
BE SUBSTANTIALLY REVISED DEPENDING ON THE FACTS OF EACH
AGREEMENT.)
A. Management and Program Structure
ABC shall be responsible for the overall technical and program management of the
Program, and technical planning and execution shall remain with ABC. The military
customer shall provide recommendations to program developments and technical
collaboration and be responsible for the review and verification of the Payable
Milestones.
B. Program Management Planning Process
Program planning will consist of an Annual Program Plan with inputs and review from
ABC and the military customer, containing the detailed schedule of research activities
and payable milestones. The Annual Program Plan will consolidate quarterly




Initial Program Plan: ABC will follow the initial program plan that is
contained in the Statement of Work (Attachment 1), and the Schedule of Payments and
Payable Milestones (Attachment 3).
2. Overall Program Plan Annual Review
(a) ABC, with the military customer review, will prepare an overall
Annual Program Plan in the first quarter of each Agreement year. (For this purpose, each
consecutive twelve (12) month period from (and including) the month of execution of this
Agreement during which this Agreement shall remain in effect shall be considered an
"Agreement Year".) The Annual Program Plan will be presented and reviewed at an
annual site review which will be attended by ABC Management, the military services
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customer, senior service management as appropriate, and other service program managers
and personnel as appropriate. ABC, with the military service customer participation and
review, will prepare a final Annual Program Plan.
(b) The Annual Program Plan provides a detailed schedule of research
activities, commits ABC to use its best efforts to meet specific performance objectives,
includes forecasted expenditures and describes the Payable Milestones. The Annual
Program Plan will consolidate all prior adjustments in the research schedule, including
revisions/modifications to payable milestones. Recommendations for changes, revisions
or modifications to the Agreement which result from the Annual Review shall be




As a result of quarterly meetings, annual reviews, or at any time during the
term of the Agreement, research progress or results may indicate that a change in the
Statement of Work and/or the Payable Milestones, would be beneficial to program
objectives. Recommendations for modifications, including justifications to support any
changes to the Statement of Work and/or the Payable Milestones, will be documented in a
letter and submitted by ABC to the military service customer with a copy to the
government Agreements Officer. This documentation letter will detail the technical,
chronological, and financial impact of the proposed modification to the research program.
ABC shall approve any Agreement modification. The Government is not obligated to
pay for additional or revised Payable Milestones until the Payable Milestones Schedule
(Attachment 3) is formally revised by the government Agreements Officer and made part
of this Agreement.
2. The military service customer shall be responsible for the review and
verification of any recommendations to revise or otherwise modify the Agreement
Statement of Work, Schedule of Payments or Payable Milestones, or other proposed
changes to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
3. For minor or administrative Agreement modifications (e.g. changes in the
paying office or appropriation data, changes to Government or ABC personnel identified
in the Agreement, etc.), no signature is required by ABC.
ARTICLE IV. AGREEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, approvals permitted or required to be made
under this agreement may be made only by the government Agreements Officer.
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Administrative and contractual matters under this Agreement shall be referred to the
following representatives of the parties:
MILITARY CUSTOMER: (INSERT NAME) (Agreements Officer)
(INSERT TELEPHONE NUMBER)
ABC: (INSERT NAME) (ABC Administrator) (INSERT TELEPHONE NUMBER)
Technical matters under this Agreement shall be referred to the following representatives:
MILITARY CUSTOMER: (INSERT NAME) (Program Manager) (INSERT
TELEPHONE NUMBER)
ABC: (INSERT NAME) (INSERT TITLE) (INSERT TELEPHONE NUMBER)
Each party may change its representatives named in this Article by written notification to
the other party.




The Government's liability to make payments to ABC is limited to only
those funds obligated under the Agreement or by modification to the Agreement. The
government may obligate funds to the Agreement incrementally.
2. If modification becomes necessary in performance of this Agreement,
pursuant to Article III, paragraph B, the government Agreements Officer and ABC
Administrator shall execute a revised Schedule of Payable Milestones consistent with the
then current Program Plan.
B. Payments
1 ABC has and agrees to maintain an established accounting system which
complies with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and the requirements of this
Agreement, and shall ensure that appropriate arrangements have been made for receiving,
distributing and accounting for Federal funds. An acceptable accounting system is one in
which all cash receipts and disbursements are controlled and documented properly.
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2. ABC shall document the accomplishments of each Payable Milestone by
submitting or otherwise providing the Payable Milestones Report required by Attachment
2, Part D. ABC shall submit an original and one (1) copies of all invoices to the
Agreements Officer for payment approval. After written verification of the
accomplishment of the Payable Milestone by the military customer, and approval by the
Agreements Officer, the invoices will be forwarded to the payment office within fifteen
(15) calendar days of receipt of the invoices at (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE).
Payment approval for the final Payable Milestone will be made after reconciliation
(INSERT APPROPRIATE DFAS OFFICE) within fifteen (30) calendar days of
(INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) transmittal. Subject to change only through written
Agreement modification, payment shall be made to the address of the ABC Administrator
set forth below.
3. Address of Payee: (INSERT NAME AND ADDRESS OF
PAYEE)
4. Limitation of Funds: In no case shall the Government's financial liability
exceed the amount obligated under this Agreement.
5. Financial Records and Reports: ABC shall maintain adequate records to
account for all funding received under this Agreement and shall maintain adequate
records to account for ABC funding provided for under this Agreement. Upon
completion or termination of this Agreement, whichever occurs earlier, the ABC
Administrator shall furnish to the Agreements Officer a copy of the Final Report required
by Attachment 2, Part E. ABC's relevant financial records are subject to examination or
audit on behalf of (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) by the Government for a period not
to exceed three (3) years after expiration of the term of this Agreement. The Agreements
Officer or designee shall have direct access to sufficient records and information ofABC,
to ensure full accountability for all funding under this Agreement. Such audit,
examination, or access shall be performed during business hours on business days upon
prior written notice and shall be subject to the security requirements of the audited party.
ARTICLE VI: DISPUTES
A. General
The Parties shall communicate with one another in good faith and in a timely and
cooperative manner when raising issues under this Article.
B. Dispute Resolution Procedures
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1.
Any disagreement, claim or dispute between (INSERT MILITARY
SERVICE) and ABC concerning questions of fact or law arising from or in connection
with this Agreement, and, whether or not involving an alleged breach of this Agreement,
may be raised only under this Article.
2. Whenever disputes, disagreements, or misunderstandings arise, the Parties
shall attempt to resolve the issue(s) involved by discussion and mutual agreement as soon
as practicable. In no event shall a dispute, disagreement or misunderstanding which arose
more than three (3) months prior to the notification made under subparagraph B.3 of this
article constitute the basis for relief under this article unless the official designated in
paragraph 4, in the interests ofjustice waives this requirement.
3. Failing resolution by mutual agreement, the aggrieved Party shall
document the dispute, disagreement, or misunderstanding by notifying the other Party
(through the government Agreements Officer or Company Administrator, as the case may
be) in writing of the relevant facts, identify unresolved issues, and specify the
clarification or remedy sought. Within five (5) working days after providing notice to the
other Party, the aggrieved Party may, in writing, request a joint decision by the (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE LEVEL OF AUTHORITY FAR ENOUGH REMOVED FROM
THE PROGRAM TO MAINTAIN A GREATER LEVEL OF IMPARTIALITY) and
senior executive (INSERT A LEVEL OF EXECUTIVE FAR ENOUGH REMOVED
FROM THE PROGRAM TO MAINTAIN A GREATER LEVEL OF IMPARTIALITY)
appointed by ABC. The other Party shall submit a written position on the matter(s) in
dispute within thirty (30) calendar days after being notified that a decision has been
requested. The (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE LEVEL OF AUTHORITY FAR
ENOUGH REMOVED FROM THE PROGRAM TO MAINTAIN A GREATER LEVEL
OF IMPARTIALITY) and senior executive (INSERT A LEVEL OF EXECUTIVE FAR
ENOUGH REMOVED FROM THE PROGRAM TO MAINTAIN A GREATER LEVEL
OF IMPARTIALITY), shall conduct a review of the matter(s) in dispute and render a
decision in writing within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of such written position.
Any such joint decision is final and binding.
4. In the absence of a joint decision, upon written request to the (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE), made within thirty (30) calendar days of the expiration of the
time for a decision under subparagraph B.3 above, the dispute shall be further reviewed.
The (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) may elect to conduct this review personally or
through a designee or jointly with a senior executive (INSERT A LEVEL OF
EXECUTIVE FAR ENOUGH REMOVED FROM THE PROGRAM TO MAINTAIN A
GREATER LEVEL OF IMPARTIALITY) appointed by ABC. Following the review, the
(INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) or designee will resolve the issue(s)and notify the
Parties in writing. Such resolution is not subject to further administrative review and, to
the extent permitted by law, shall be final and binding.
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C. Limitation of Damages
Claims for damages of any nature whatsoever pursued under this Agreement shall be
limited to direct damages only up to the aggregate amount of (INSERT MILITARY
SERVICE) funding disbursed as of the time the dispute arises. In no event shall
(INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) be liable for claims for consequential, punitive, special
and incidental damages, claims for lost profits, or other indirect damages.
ARTICLE VII: PATENT RIGHTS (NOTE: Its is the military customer's philosophy
to allow for innovation in processing, handling and ownership of rights regarding patents
conveived or first reducted to practice under this agreement if it can be proven to be more
economically prudent. Offerors should request changes to the clause below in their
proposal.
(NOTE: IN THE EVENT MARCH-IN RIGHTS ARE THE ONLY RIGHTS
REASONABLY WARRANTED, THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE REPLACED WITH A
CONCISELY WRITTEN ARTICLE DEFINING AND DESCRIBING MARCH-IN





"Invention" means any invention or discovery which is or may be
patentable or otherwise protectable under Title 35 of the United States Code.
2. "Made" when used in relation to any invention means the conception or
first actual reduction to practice of such invention.
3. "Practical application" means to manufacture, in the case of a composition
of product; to practice, in the case of a process or method, or to operate, in the case of a
machine or system; and, in each case, under such conditions as to establish that the
invention is capable of being utilized and that its benefits are, to the extent permitted by
law or Government regulations, available to the public on reasonable terms.
4. "Subject invention" means any invention conceived or first actually
reduced to practice in the performance of work under this Agreement.
B. Allocation of Principal Rights
Unless ABC shall have notified (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) (in accordance with
subparagraph C.2 below) that ABC does not intend to retain title, ABC shall retain the
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entire right, title, and interest throughout the world to each subject invention consistent
with the provisions of this Article and 35 U.S.C. § 202. With respect to any subject
invention in which ABC retains title, (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) shall have a
nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced
on behalf of the United States the subject invention throughout the world.
C. Invention Disclosure, Election of Title, and Filing of Patent Application
1
.
ABC shall disclose each subject invention to (INSERT MILITARY
SERVICE) within four (4) months after the inventor discloses it in writing to his
company personnel responsible for patent matters. The disclosure to (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE) shall be in the form of a written report and shall identify the
Agreement under which the invention was made and the identity of the inventor(s). It
shall be sufficiently complete in technical detail to convey a clear understanding to the
extent known at the time of the disclosure, of the nature, purpose, operation, and the
physical, chemical, biological, or electrical characteristics of the invention. The
disclosure shall also identify any publication, sale, or public use of the invention and
whether a manuscript describing the invention has been submitted for publication and, if
so, whether it has been accepted for publication at the time of disclosure. ABC shall also
submit to (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) an annual listing of subject inventions.
2. IfABC determines that it does not intend to retain title to any such
invention, ABC shall notify (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE), in writing, within eight
(8) months of disclosure to (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE). However, in any case
where publication, sale, or public use has initiated the one (l)-year statutory period
wherein valid patent protection can still be obtained in the United States, the period for
such notice may be shortened by (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) to a date that is no
more than sixty (60) calendar days prior to the end of the statutory period.
3. ABC shall file its initial patent application on a subject invention to which
it elects to retain title within one (1) year after election of title or, if earlier, prior to the
end of the statutory period wherein valid patent protection can be obtained in the United
States after a publication, or sale, or public use. ABC may elect to file patent applications
in additional countries (including the European Patent Office and the Patent Cooperation
Treaty) within either ten (10) months of the corresponding initial patent application or six
(6) months from the date permission is granted by the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks to file foreign patent applications, where such filing has been prohibited by a
Secrecy Order.
4. Requests for extension of the time for disclosure election, and filing under
Article VII, paragraph C, may, at the discretion of (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE), and
after considering the position of ABC, be granted.
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D. Conditions When the Government May Obtain Title
Upon (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) written request, ABC shall convey title to any




IfABC fails to disclose or elects not to retain title to the subject invention
within the times specified in paragraph C of this Article; provided, that (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE) may only request title within sixty (60) calendar days after
learning of the failure ofABC to disclose or elect within the specified times.
2. In those countries in which ABC fails to file patent applications within the
times specified in paragraph C of this Article; provided, that ifABC has filed a patent
application in a country after the times specified in paragraph C of this Article, but prior
to its receipt of the written request by (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE), ABC shall
continue to retain title in that country; or
3. In any country in which ABC decides not to continue the prosecution of
any application for, to pay the maintenance fees on, or defend in reexamination or
opposition proceedings on, a patent on a subject invention.
E. Minimum Rights to ABC and Protection of ABC's Right to File
1
.
ABC shall retain a nonexclusive, royalty-free license throughout the world
in each subject invention to which the Government obtains title, except ifABC fails to
disclose the invention within the times specified in paragraph C of this Article. The ABC
license extends to the domestic (including Canada) subsidiaries and affiliates, if any,
within the corporate structure of which ABC is a party and includes the right to grant
licenses of the same scope to the extent that ABC was legally obligated to do so at the
time the Agreement was awarded. The license is transferable only with the approval of
(INSERT MILITARY SERVICE), except when transferred to the successor of that part
of the business to which the invention pertains. (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE)
approval for license transfer shall not be unreasonably withheld.
2. The ABC domestic license may be revoked or modified by (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE) to the extent necessary to achieve expeditious practical
application of the subject invention pursuant to an application for an exclusive license
submitted consistent with appropriate provisions at 37 CFR Part 404. This license shall
not be revoked in that field of use or the geographical areas in which ABC has achieved
practical application and continues to make the benefits of the invention reasonably
accessible to the public. The license in any foreign country may be revoked or modified
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at the discretion of (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) to the extent ABC, its licensees, or
the subsidiaries or affiliates have failed to achieve practical application in that foreign
country.
3. Before revocation or modification of the license, (INSERT MILITARY
SERVICE) shall furnish ABC a written notice of its intention to revoke or modify the
license, and ABC shall be allowed thirty (30) calendar days (or such other time as may be
authorized for good cause shown) after the notice to show cause why the license should
not be revoked or modified.
F. Action to Protect the Government's Interest
1
.
ABC agrees to execute or to have executed and promptly deliver to
(INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) all instruments necessary to (i) establish or confirm the
rights the Government has throughout the world in those subject inventions to which
ABC elects to retain title, and (ii) convey title to (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) when
requested under paragraph D of this Article and to enable the Government to obtain
patent protection throughout the world in that subject invention.
2. ABC agrees to require, by written agreement, its employees, other than
clerical and nontechnical employees, to disclose promptly in writing to personnel
identified as responsible for the administration of patent matters and in a format
suggested by ABC each subject invention made under this Agreement in order that ABC
can comply with the disclosure provisions of paragraph C of this Article. ABC shall
instruct employees, through employee agreements or other suitable educational programs,
on the importance of reporting inventions in sufficient time to permit the filing of patent
applications prior to U. S. or foreign statutory bars.
3
.
ABC shall notify (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) of any decisions not
to continue the prosecution of a patent application, pay maintenance fees, or defend in a
reexamination or opposition proceedings on a patent, in any country, not less than thirty
(30) calendar days before the expiration of the response period required by the relevant
patent office.
4. ABC shall include, within the specification of any United States patent
application and any patent issuing thereon covering a subject invention, the following
statement: "This invention was made with Government support under Agreement No.
MDA972-9*-3-00** awarded by (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE). The Government
has certain rights in the invention."
G. Lower Tier Agreements
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ABC shall include this Article, suitably modified, to identify the Parties, in all
subcontracts or lower tier agreements, regardless of tier, for experimental, developmental,
or research work.
H. Reporting on Utilization of Subject Inventions
ABC agrees to submit, during the term of the Agreement, an annual report on the
utilization of a subject invention or on efforts at obtaining such utilization that are being
made by ABC or licensees or assignees of the inventor. Such reports shall include
information regarding the status of development, date of first commercial sale or use,
gross royalties received by ABC, and such other data and information as the agency may
reasonably specify. ABC also agrees to provide additional reports as may be requested
by (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) in connection with any march-in proceedings
undertaken by (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) in accordance with paragraph J of this
Article. Consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(5), (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) agrees
it shall not disclose such information to persons outside the Government without
permission of ABC.
I. Preference for American Industry
Notwithstanding any other provision of this clause, ABC agrees that it shall not grant to
any person the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States or
Canada unless such person agrees that any product embodying the subject invention or
produced through the use of the subject invention shall be manufactured substantially in
the United States or Canada. However, in individual cases, the requirements for such an
agreement may be waived by (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) upon a showing by ABC
that reasonable but unsuccessful efforts have been made to grant licenses on similar terms
to potential licensees that would be likely to manufacture substantially in the United
States or that, under the circumstances, domestic manufacture is not commercially
feasible.
J. March-in Rights
ABC agrees that, with respect to any subject invention in which it has retained title,
(INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) has the right to require ABC, an assignee, or exclusive
licensee of a subject invention to grant a non-exclusive license to a responsible applicant
or applicants, upon terms that are reasonable under the circumstances, and if ABC,
assignee, or exclusive licensee refuses such a request, (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE)




Such action is necessary because ABC or assignee has not taken effective
steps, consistent with the intent of this Agreement, to achieve practical application of the
subject invention;
2. Such action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not
reasonably satisfied by ABC, assignee, or their licensees;
3. Such action is necessary to meet requirements for public use and such
requirements are not reasonably satisfied by ABC, assignee, or licensees; or
4. Such action is necessary because the agreement required by paragraph (I)
of this Article has not been obtained or waived or because a licensee of the exclusive
right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States is in breach of such
Agreement.
ARTICLE VIII: DATA RIGHTS (NOTE: This article may be substantially revised
depending on the facts of each agreement, i.e., "Limited rights" or "march-in rights" are
warranted.
It is the government's philosophy to allow for innovation in processing, handling and
ownership of right regarding technical data and computer software developed under this
agreement if it can be proven to be more economically prudent. Offerors should request




"Government Purpose Rights", as used in this article, means rights to use,
duplicate, or disclose Data, in whole or in part and in any manner, for Government
purposes only, and to have or permit others to do so for Government purposes only.
2. "Unlimited Rights", as used in this article, means rights to use, duplicate,
release, or disclose, Data in whole or in part, in any manner and for any purposes
whatsoever, and to have or permit others to do so.
3. "Data", as used in this article, means recorded information, regardless of
form or method of recording, which includes but is not limited to, technical data,
software, trade secrets, and mask works. The term does not include financial,
administrative, cost, pricing or management information and does not include subject
inventions included under Article VII.
B. Allocation of Principal Rights
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1.
This Agreement shall be performed with mixed Government and ABC
funding. The Parties agree that in consideration for Government funding, ABC intends
to reduce to practical application items, components and processes developed under this
Agreement.
2. ABC agrees to retain and maintain in good condition until (INSERT
NUMBER OF YEAR) ( ) years after completion or termination of this Agreement, all
Data necessary to achieve practical application. In the event of exercise of the
Government's March-in Rights as set forth under Article VII or subparagraph B.3 of this
article, ABC agrees, upon written request from the Government, to deliver at no
additional cost to the Government, all Data necessary to achieve practical application
within sixty (60) calendar days from the date of the written request. The Government
shall retain Unlimited Rights, as defined in paragraph A above, to this delivered Data.
3. ABC agrees that, with respect to Data necessary to achieve practical
application, (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) has the right to require ABC to deliver all
such Data to (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) in accordance with its reasonable
directions if (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) determines that:
(a) Such action is necessary because ABC or assignee has not
taken effective steps, consistent with the intent of this Agreement, to achieve practical
application of the technology developed during the performance of this Agreement;
(b) Such action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs
which are not reasonably satisfied by ABC, assignee, or their licensees; or
(c) Such action is necessary to meet requirements for public use
and such requirements are not reasonably satisfied by ABC, assignee, or licensees.
4. With respect to Data delivered pursuant to Attachment 2 (and listed below), the
Government shall receive Government Purpose Rights, as defined in paragraph A above.
With respect to all Data delivered, in the event of the Government's exercise of its right
under subparagraph B.2 of this article, the Government shall receive Unlimited Rights.
C. Marking of Data
Pursuant to paragraph B above, any Data delivered under this Agreement shall be marked
with the following legend:
Use, duplication, or disclosure is subject to the restrictions as stated in Agreement
MDA972- 9*-3-00** between the Government and ABC.
108
D. Lower Tier Agreements
ABC shall include this Article, suitably modified to identify the Parties, in all
subcontracts or lower tier agreements, regardless of tier, for experimental, developmental,
or research work.
ARTICLE IX: FOREIGN ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY (NOTE: It is the
government's intention to resrtict this technology from flowing overseas without
approval to ensure the economic and security issues have been resolved prior to any
release. If the offerors desire proposed changes to this article they should explain
rationale completely.)
This Article shall remain in effect during the term of the Agreement and for (INSERT




"Foreign Firm or Institution" means a firm or institution organized or
existing under the laws of a country other than the United States, its territories, or
possessions. The term includes, for purposes of this Agreement, any agency or
instrumentality of a foreign government; and firms, institutions or business organizations
which are owned or substantially controlled by foreign governments, firms, institutions,
or individuals.
2. "Know-How" means all information including, but not limited to
discoveries, formulas, materials, inventions, processes, ideas, approaches, concepts,
techniques, methods, software, programs, documentation, procedures, firmware,
hardware, technical data, specifications, devices, apparatus and machines.
3. "Technology" means discoveries, innovations, Know-How and inventions,
whether patentable or not, including computer software, recognized under U.S. law as
intellectual creations to which rights of ownership accrue, including, but not limited to,
patents, trade secrets, maskworks, and copyrights developed under this Agreement.
B. General
The Parties agree that research findings and technology developments arising under this
Agreement may constitute a significant enhancement to the national defense, and to the
economic vitality of the United States. Accordingly, access to important technology
developments under this Agreement by Foreign Firms or Institutions must be carefully
controlled. The controls contemplated in this Article are in addition to, and are not
109
intended to change or supersede, the provisions of the International Traffic in Arms
Regulation (22 CFR pt. 121 et seq.), the DoD Industrial Security Regulation (DoD
5220.22-R) and the Department of Commerce Export Regulation (15 CFR pt. 770 et seq.)
C. Restrictions on Sale or Transfer of Technology to Foreign Firms or Institutions
1
.
In order to promote the national security interests of the United States and
to effectuate the policies that underlie the regulations cited above, the procedures stated in
subparagraphs C.2, C.3, and C.4 below shall apply to any transfer of Technology. For
purposes of this paragraph, a transfer includes a sale of the company, and sales or
licensing of Technology. Transfers do not include:
(a) sales of products or components, or
(b) licenses of software or documentation related to sales of products
or components, or
(c) transfer to foreign subsidiaries ofABC for purposes related to this
Agreement, or
(d) transfer which provides access to Technology to a Foreign Firm or
Institution which is an approved source of supply or source for the conduct of research
under this Agreement provided that such transfer shall be limited to that necessary to
allow the firm or institution to perform its approved role under this Agreement.
2. ABC shall provide timely notice to (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) of
any proposed transfers from ABC of Technology developed under this Agreement to
Foreign Firms or Institutions. If (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) determines that the
transfer may have adverse consequences to the national security interests of the United
States, ABC, its vendors, and (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) shall jointly endeavor to
find alternatives to the proposed transfer which obviate or mitigate potential adverse
consequences of the transfer but which provide substantially equivalent benefits to ABC.
3. In any event, ABC shall provide written notice to the (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE) Program Manager and Agreements Officer of any proposed
transfer to a foreign firm or institution at least sixty (60) calendar days prior to the
proposed date of transfer. Such notice shall cite this Article and shall state specifically
what is to be transferred and the general terms of the transfer. Within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of ABC's written notification, the government Agreements Officer shall
advise ABC whether it consents to the proposed transfer. In cases where (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE) does not concur or sixty (60) calendar days after receipt and
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(INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) provides no decision, ABC may utilize the procedures
under Article VI, Disputes. No transfer shall take place until a decision is rendered.
4. In the event the transfer of Technology to Foreign Firms or Institutions
which is NOT approved by (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE), ABC shall (a) refund to
(INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) funds paid for the development of the Technology and
(b) the Government shall have a non-exclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up
license to practice or have preacticed on behalf of the United States the Technology
throughout the world for Government and any and all other purposes, particularly to
effectuate the intent of his Agreement. Upon request of the Government, the Consortium
shall provide written confirmation of such licenses.
D. Lower Tier Agreements
ABC shall include this Article, suitably modified, to identify the Parties, in all
subcontracts or lower tier agreements, regardless of tier, for experimental, developmental,
or research work.
ARTICLE X: CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
This Agreement is subject to the compliance requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as amended (42 U.S.C. 2000-d) relating to nondiscrimination in Federally
assisted programs. ABC has signed an Assurance of Compliance with the
nondiscriminatory provisions of the Act.
ARTICLE XI: EXECUTION
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the Parties and supersedes all prior
and contemporaneous agreements, understandings, negotiations and discussions among
the Parties, whether oral or written, with respect to the subject matter hereof. This
Agreement may be revised only by written consent ofABC and the government
Agreements Officer. This Agreement, or modifications thereto, may be executed in
counterparts each of which shall be deemed as original, but all of which taken together
shall constitute one and the same instrument.
ARTICLE XII: INSURANCE
The contractor shall propose the appropriate type of insurance.
ARTICLE VIII: GOVERNMENT FURNISHED PROPERTY
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The following Government property, information, equipment, facilities and services shall
be provided upon the written approval of the cognizant agreement officer:
(Offerors will list all desired GFE, GFP, GFI, GFF, and GFS.)
(a) The Government will use best efforts to deliver to the Contractor, at the time and
locations stated in this contract, the Government-furnished property stated in this
contract, the Government-furnished property described in the Schedule or specifications.
(b) Title to Government-furnished property will remain with the Government. The
Contract will use the Government-furnished property only in connection with this
contract. The Contractor will maintain adequate property control records in accordance
with sound industrial practice and will make such records available.
(c) Upon delivery of Government-furnished property to the Contractor, the Contractor
assumes the risk and responsibility for its loss or damage, except —
(1) For reasonable wear and tear;
(2) To the extent property is consumed in performing this agreement; or
(3) As otherwise provided for by the provisions of this agreement.
(d) Upon completing this contract, the Contractor will follow the instructions of the
Agreements Officer regarding the disposition of all Government-furnished property not
consumed in performing this contract or previously delivery to the Government. The
Contractor will prepare for shipment, deliver f.o.b. origin, or dispose of the Government
property, as may be directed or authorized by the Agreements Officer. The net proceeds
of any such disposal will be credited to the agreement price or will be paid to the
Government as directed by the Agreements Officer.
ARTICLE XIV: WARRANTIES
( Offerors will provide appropriate commercial warranties)
ARTICLE XII: ORDER OF PRECEDENCE
In the event of any inconsistency between the terms of this Agreement and language set
forth in the Statement of Work, the inconsistency shall be resolved by giving precedence




On or before ninety (90) calendar days after the effective date of the Agreement and
quarterly thereafter throughout the term of the Agreement, the company shall submit or
otherwise provide a quarterly report. Two (2) copies shall be submitted or
otherwise provided to the (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) Program Manager,
one (1) copy shall be submitted or otherwise provided to the government Agreements
Officer and one (1) copy shall be submitted or otherwise provided to (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE PM). The report will have two (2) major sections.
1
.
Technical Status Report. The technical status report will detail
technical progress to date and report on all problems, technical issues or major
developments during the reporting period. The technical status report will include a
report on the status of consortium collaborative activities during the reporting period.
2. Business Status Report. The business status report shall provide
summarized details of the resource status of this Agreement, including the status of the
contributions by the Company/Consortium participants. This report will include a
quarterly accounting of current expenditures as outlined in the Annual Program Plan.
Any major deviations shall be explained along with discussions of the adjustment actions
proposed. The report will also include an accounting of interest earned on Government
funds, IF ANY. The Company/Consortium is reminded that interest is not expected to
accrue under this Agreement. In the event that interest does accrue on Government
funds, the Company/Consortium is required to provide an explanation for the interest
accrued in the business report. Depending on the circumstances, the Payable Milestones
may require adjustment. In any event, the Government reserves the right to require
interest amounts earned in excess of $250 per year to be remitted at periodic intervals to
be agreed upon by both Parties. All such interest rebates shall be made payable to the
United States Treasury.
B. ANNUAL PROGRAM PLAN DOCUMENT
The company shall submit or otherwise provide to the (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE) Program Manager one (1) copy of a report which describes the
Annual Program Plan as described in Article III, Section D. This document shall be
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submitted not later than thirty (30) calendar days following the Annual Site Review as
described in Article III, Section D.
C. SPECIAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
As agreed to by the Company/Consortium and the (INSERT MILITARY
SERVICE) Program Manager, the company shall submit or otherwise provide to the
(INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) Program Manager one (1) copy of special reports on
significant events such as significant target accomplishments by Company/Consortium
Members, significant tests, experiments, or symposia.
D. PAYABLE MILESTONES REPORTS
The company shall submit or otherwise provide to the (INSERT
MILITARY SERVICE) Program Manager, documentation describing the extent of
accomplishment of Payable Milestones. This information shall be as required by Article
V, paragraph B and shall be sufficient for the (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) Program
Manager to reasonably verify the accomplishment of the milestone of the event in
accordance with the Statement of Work.




The company shall submit or otherwise provide a Final Report making
full disclosure of all major developments by the Company/Consortium upon completion
of the Agreement or within sixty (60) calendar days of termination of this Agreement.
With the approval of the (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) Program Manager, reprints of
published articles may be attached to the Final Report. Two (2) copies shall be submitted
or otherwise provided to the (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE) Program Manager and
one (1) copy shall be submitted or otherwise provided to (INSERT MILITARY
SERVICE)/(INSERT PROGRAM OFFICE. One (1) copy shall be submitted to the
Defense Technical Information Center, Attn: DTIC-O, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite
0944, Fort Belvior, VA 22060-6218.
2. The Final Report shall be marked with a distribution statement to
denote the extent of its availability for distribution, release, and disclosure without
additional approvals or authorizations. The Final Report shall be marked on the front
page in a conspicuous place with the following marking:
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"DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT B. Distribution authorized to U.S.
Government agencies only to protect information not owned by the U.S. Government and
protected by a contractor's "limited rights" statement, or received with the understanding
that it not be routinely transmitted outside the U.S. Government. Other requests for this
document shall be referred to (INSERT MILITARY SERVICE)/Technical Information
Officer."
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SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS AND PAYABLE MILESTONES
Military Service Company/Consortium
Task Month Payable Milestones Payment Payment
1 (Data entered as appropriate)
FUNDING SCHEDULE
A. PROJECTED PROGRAM FUNDING COMMITMENTS
Service Company/Consortium
Funding Contribution
FY 9* $ $
FY 9* $ $
TOTALS $ $
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